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Preference revelation and supply response in the arena of local government

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  • D. Kenyon

Abstract

This paper represents an initial effort to build a model of the demand revelation and supply response mechanisms implicit in the effect of citizen lobbying efforts on the decisions of municipal officials. A utilitarian social welfare function was used as a benchmark to judge the results of this lobbying model. The empirical evidence presented indicated that both elected and appointed city officials in Ann Arbor respond to citizen lobbying opposing or supporting particular zoning amendment proposals. The normative evaluation of this response produced mixed results. Much of the public choice/public finance literature has focused on a search for a new demand revealing mechanism that would circumvent the free rider problem. This approach was criticized by Bohm (1979) for not producing politically acceptable demand revealing mechanisms; recent research indicates some uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the free rider problem. An alternative approach taken by this paper is to examine the workings and efficiency properties of previously ignored and already existing mechanisms for revelation of demand. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

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  • D. Kenyon, 1984. "Preference revelation and supply response in the arena of local government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 147-160, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:2:p:147-160
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124157
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    2. Peter Bohm, 1979. "Estimating willingness to pay: Why and how?," Framed Field Experiments 00127, The Field Experiments Website.
    3. Mark Sproule-Jones, 1974. "A description and explanation of citizen participation in a canadian municipality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 73-83, March.
    4. repec:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:2:p:142-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Austen-Smith, David, 1980. "Individual contribution to public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 359-361.
    6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    7. Prewitt, Kenneth, 1970. "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 5-17, March.
    8. Howard R. Bowen, 1943. "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 58(1), pages 27-48.
    9. Friedrich Schneider & Werner W. Pommerehne, 1981. "Free Riding and Collective Action: An Experiment in Public Microeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 96(4), pages 689-704.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hamlett, Cathy A., 1987. "Private provision of local rural roads," ISU General Staff Papers 198701010800009541, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Michael E. Bell & John H. Bowman, 1987. "The Effect of Various Intergovernmental aid Types on Local Own-Source Revenues: The Case of Property Taxes in Minnesota Cities," Public Finance Review, , vol. 15(3), pages 282-297, July.

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