Rational expectations in elections: some experimental results based on a multidimensional model
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00124819
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Cited by:
- Richard F. Potthoff, 2014. "Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-30, October.
- Valentino Larcinese, 2007.
"Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 387-411, June.
- Valentino Larcinese, 2005. "Does Political Knowledge Increase Turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British General Election," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 01, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Larcinese, Valentino, 2005. "Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3614, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dougherty, Keith L. & Kisaalita, Alice & McKissick, Jordan & Katz, Evan, 2020. "Stopping rules for majority voting: A public choice experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 353-364.
- Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Sugato Dasgupta & Kenneth C. Williams, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Novice Incumbents," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 409-438, October.
- Keith Dougherty & Brian Pitts & Justin Moeller & Robi Ragan, 2014. "An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 359-382, March.
- Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Larcinese, Valentino, 2017.
"The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information,"
Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 411-425, July.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Valentino Larcinese & Stephanie Rickard, 2013. "The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 048, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2010.
"Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study,"
American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 700-717, July.
- Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2007. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 014, University of Siena.
- Aristotelis Boukouras & Will Jennings & Lunzheng Li & Zacharias Maniadis, 2019.
"Can Biased Polls Distort Electoral Results? Evidence From The Lab And The Field,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
19/06, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Aristotelis Boukouras & Will Jennings & Lunzheng Li & Zacharias Maniadis, 2019. "Can Biased Polls Distort Electoral Results? Evidence from the Lab and the Field," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001528, David K. Levine.
- Boukouras, Aristotelis & Jennings, Will & Li, Lunzheng & Maniadis, Zacharias, 2023. "Can biased polls distort electoral results? Evidence from the lab," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
- repec:cep:stieop:48 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:pri:cepsud:111palfrey is not listed on IDEAS
- Plott, Charles R. & Llewellyn, Morgan, 2015. "Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 208-223.
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