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Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting

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  • Steven Johnson

Abstract

This paper addresses the need to learn more about the relative desirability of the current FASB and its alternatives. It responds to this need by demonstrating how a given standards-setting alternative might be preliminarily analyzed in terms of its feasibility and the degree to which its theoretical objectives are operationally attainable. The analysis emphasizes that it is not the existence of possible operational shortcomings that is important, but how its operational properties compare with those of other available alternatives. The analysis itself reveals that, in spite of operational shortcomings, standards-setting by means of a demand-revealing process may be an alternative worthy of further consideration both in its own right, and as a basis of comparison for assessing the relative strengths and limitations of the current FASB. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Johnson, 1984. "Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 3-24, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:1:p:3-24
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124596
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