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Why so much stability?: Another opinion

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  • Richard Niemi

Abstract

In this paper I have suggested three important factors that render majority rule stable in real world settings; small numbers of alternatives, constraints on agenda setters, and a meaningful weakening of the single-peakedness condition. These simple points, along with Shepsle's complementary notion of structure-induced equilibria and an extension thereof incorporating strategic behavior (Krehbiel, 1983), go a long way toward explaining the existence of stable outcomes in the real world. The disequilibrium results are still extremely important in making us realize the long term fragility of social choices. If other alternatives can virtually always defeat the selected alternative given the ‘right’ structuring of the choice situation, then one task of politicians is to try to structure later choices so as to overturn the original decisions (Riker, 1982: Chapters 8–9). Still, this is a slow process at best, and some decisions are never reconsidered. Therefore, this caveat notwithstanding, constrained (in terms of voting orders) selection from a small number of alternatives — especially from a set near clusters of ideal points and with preference curves often approximating single-peakedness — is a more realistic picture of legislative choice than is unconstrained choice among an infinity of alternatives. Finally, I note that some of the factors I have discussed can be incorporated under the general heading of institutional structures. Procedures for ordering alternatives to be voted on, for example, are part of an institution's rules. The existence of multiple agenda setters may also be part of the formal structure (e.g., committee chairmen), but it may not be (e.g., factions may come and go). In contrast, the selection of alternatives near members' ideal points is never written into formal procedures. Nor is any form of single-peakedness ever structurally mandated. Thus institutional structures and other factors combine to create at least short-run stability in the real world. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

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  • Richard Niemi, 1983. "Why so much stability?: Another opinion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 261-270, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:2:p:261-270
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00210360
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    2. Niemi, Richard G., 1969. "Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 488-497, June.
    3. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-354, March.
    4. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    5. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
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    1. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1986. "Research note Partial single-peakedness: An extension and clarification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 71-80, January.
    2. Bjørn Rasch, 1987. "Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 57-73, January.
    3. Robert Salvino & Michael T. Tasto & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2012. "A direct test of direct democracy: New England town meetings," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(18), pages 2393-2402, June.
    4. Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Michael T. Tasto, 2008. "Independent Cities and Counties in Virginia: Substitute Jurisdictions?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 45(1), pages 53-66, January.
    5. Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.
    6. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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