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Social choice and the status quo

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  • Jeffrey Richelson

Abstract

I have investigated the social choice problem from the perspective of seeking to insure that a majority of voters are not worse off after the election, such that worse off means selecting an alternative that would lose to the status quo in a majority contest. This investigation led rather naturally to using the status quo as a benchmark against which to judge challengers. Both the F dm and F * dm procedures have attractive properties. Both satisfy the Not Worse-Off and Majority Improvement Principles. The F dm rule is rationalizable by a transitive R and allows for ease of voter response, while the F dm* rule satisfies binary Pareto. Both satisfy IIA, anonymity and (m − 1) neutrality. Examination of the results of repeated applications of the F dm procedure reveals that these results are heavily influenced by the starting point, with there being no guarantee that the process will move into the minmax, M-dominant, or similar solution set. Whether this is considered acceptable will depend on whether one believes the social choice should be a subset of these sets regardless of the identity of the status quo. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Richelson, 1984. "Social choice and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 225-234, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:3:p:225-234
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124942
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas H. Blair, 1979. "On Variable Majority Rule and Kramer's Dynamic Competitive Process," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(4), pages 667-673.
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    5. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    6. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.

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