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Public opinion and regulatory behavior

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  • S. Anderson
  • A. Glazer

Abstract

This paper measures the responsiveness of a public agency to changes in public opinion. In particular, it shows that the number of compulsory directives issued by the Federal Aviation Administration to the airline industry (a) rises following an increase in public concern over aviation safety, as measured by the amount of newspaper coverage accorded the issue; (b) falls following a presumed increase in industry opposition to such directives, as measured by the number of aircraft accidents that occurred in previous periods; (c) does not increase following an increase in the number of safety defects discovered, as measured by the number of accidents and flights occurring in earlier periods. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • S. Anderson & A. Glazer, 1984. "Public opinion and regulatory behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 187-194, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:2:p:187-194
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00140832
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moran, Mark J & Weingast, Barry R, 1982. "Congress as the," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 109-113, May.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. Cooter, Robert & Topakian, Gregory, 1980. "Political Economy of a Public Corporation: Pricing Objectives of BART," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 299-318, June.
    4. Cooter, Robert & Topakian, Gregory, 1980. "Political economy of a public corporation : Pricing objectives of BART," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 299-318, June.
    5. Eckert, Ross D, 1981. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 113-120, April.
    6. Daniel McFadden, 1976. "The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 55-72, Spring.
    7. James B. Kau & Donald Keenan & Paul H. Rubin, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 271-293.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cahan, Steven F., 1996. "Political use of income: Some experimental evidence from Capitol Hill," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 69-87.

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