IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v41y1983i3p387-401.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An experiment in the demand-revealing process

Author

Listed:
  • T. Tideman

Abstract

The principal findings of this experiment are: It is somewhat time-consuming but not otherwise difficult to employ the demand-revealing process in groups of 10 to 60. The ability of the demand-revealing process to take account of intensities of preferences is appreciated by many of the persons who have used the process, but the departure from one-man-one-vote is strongly resisted by others. The outcomes reached by demand-revealing differed from majority rule in about one-tenth of the cases. The improvement in efficiency associated with these reversals of majority rule was 2.25 percent of the net benefit of making the efficient decisions. The Clarke taxes, which would decline in percentage terms as group size increased, were 3.04 percent of the net value of efficient decisions for the decisions studied. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Suggested Citation

  • T. Tideman, 1983. "An experiment in the demand-revealing process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 387-401, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:3:p:387-401
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00141071
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00141071
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00141071?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    2. Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-1159, December.
    3. Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    5. Bohm, Peter, 1972. "Estimating demand for public goods: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 111-130.
    6. Bruce Scherr & Emerson Babb, 1975. "Pricing public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 35-48, September.
    7. repec:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:2:p:198-215 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Peter Bohm, 1972. "Estimating the demand for public goods: An experiment," Framed Field Experiments 00126, The Field Experiments Website.
    9. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tatsuki Homma & Ryosuke Iba & Junyi Shen & Takuma Wakayama & Hirofumi Yamamura & Takehiko Yamato, 2022. "The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 429-505, April.
    2. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 45-73, July.
    3. R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton & Svetlana Pevnitskaya, 2019. "A new experimental mechanism to investigate polarized demands for public goods: the effects of censoring," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 585-609, September.
    4. Francesco Feri & Anita Gantner & Wolfgang Höchtl & Rupert Sausgruber, 2013. "The pivotal mechanism revisited: some evidence on group manipulation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 23-51, March.
    5. , J. & ,, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    6. Arthur Schram, 2016. "Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 214-226, June.
    7. Charles Laine, 1985. "Distribution of jointly owned private goods by the demand-revealing process: Applications to divorce settlements and estate administration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 437-457, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Don Coursey & William Schulze, 1986. "The application of laboratory experimental economics to the contingent valuation of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 47-68, January.
    2. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. JOHN McMILLAN, 1979. "The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(2), pages 95-107, June.
    4. Charles Laine, 1985. "Distribution of jointly owned private goods by the demand-revealing process: Applications to divorce settlements and estate administration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 437-457, January.
    5. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
    6. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2010. "Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 455-470, March.
    7. Matt Van Essen, 2013. "Making efficient public good decisions using an augmented Ausubel auction," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 57-68, May.
    8. Jon X. Eguia & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 2811-2828, September.
    9. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2014. "Efficient voting with penalties," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1419, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    10. Esther Gal-Or & Anindya Ghose, 2005. "The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 186-208, June.
    11. Martin Gaynor, 1989. "The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 261-267, June.
    12. Feldmann, Martin & Müller, Stephanie, 2003. "An incentive scheme for true information providing in Supply Chains," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 63-73, April.
    13. E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "The robustness of quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 75-107, July.
    14. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 109-130, October.
    15. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "Gordon Tullock and Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 47-60, July.
    16. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2007. "Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem," Working Papers e07-8, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    17. Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 10081, CESifo.
    18. Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom, 2019. "Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 416-454.
    19. Tatsuki Homma & Ryosuke Iba & Junyi Shen & Takuma Wakayama & Hirofumi Yamamura & Takehiko Yamato, 2022. "The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 429-505, April.
    20. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "Quadratic voting and the public good: introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 1-22, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:3:p:387-401. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.