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Property rights in bureaucracies and bureaucratic efficiency

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  • John Dobra

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  • John Dobra, 1983. "Property rights in bureaucracies and bureaucratic efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 95-99, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:40:y:1983:i:1:p:95-99
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00174999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barry Keating & Maryann Keating, 1975. "Institutional entropy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 105-106, March.
    2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    3. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(2), pages 110-110.
    4. Martin, Donald L, 1972. "Job Property Rights and Job Defections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 385-410, October.
    5. R. Auster, 1974. "The Gpitpc and institutional entropy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 77-83, September.
    6. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 351-351.
    7. R. Auster, 1976. "Entropy and size, a clarification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 79-80, March.
    8. Stigler, George J, 1976. "The Xistence of X-Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 213-216, March.
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