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An economic theory of governability: Choosing policy and optimizing performance

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  • Mark Lichbach

Abstract

When collective violence occurs, a management and decision-making crisis exists for governmental authorities. We examine this situation with an economic model of governability within states. Political decision-makers wish to minimize two goals that enter as components of the government's performance function: political violence and revolutionary change of regime. We further assume that authorities have only a scarce supply of two policy instruments available with which to respond to violence: the accommodation and repression of the demands of their oppositions. Moreover, these elites confront a number of structural determinants of violence and revolution. After laying out these basic components of the model, we propose several theorems about the causes of political performance and about the regime's decision-calculus. These are then proven through a comparative static analysis of the model and by optimizing the performance function. The deductions indicate that the regime's policy instruments produce contradictory effects on the targetted levels of violence and revolution. In general, both accommodation and repression of opponents will, up to some point, reduce violence (an intended consequence) but increase revolution (an unintended consequence). Thus, upon close examination the goals of political decision-makers, to simultaneously minimize both violence and revolution, turn out to be inconsistent. Authorities therefore select an optimal level of performance by balancing the costs and benefits that come from accommodating and repressing their opponents. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Lichbach, 1984. "An economic theory of governability: Choosing policy and optimizing performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 307-337, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:44:y:1984:i:2:p:307-337
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118766
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    3. Mark Lichbach, 1982. "Governability in interwar Europe: A formal model of authority and performance," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 197-216, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giulio Gallarotti, 1989. "Legitimacy as a capital asset of the state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 43-61, October.
    2. Darin Christensen, 2018. "The Geography of Repression in Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(7), pages 1517-1543, August.
    3. Nicole Janz & Noel Johnston & Paasha Mahdavi, 2022. "Expropriation and human rights: does the seizure of FDI signal wider repression?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 847-875, October.
    4. Timothy M. Peterson, 2017. "Export Diversity and Human Rights," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(8), pages 1740-1767, September.
    5. Mark Irving Lichbach, 1987. "Deterrence or Escalation?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 266-297, June.

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