Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00118771
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- James B. Kau & Donald Keenan & Paul H. Rubin, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(2), pages 271-293.
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- Daniel Richards, 1986. "A note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of Political Action Committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 71-79, January.
- Nicholas R. Jenkins & Michelangelo Landgrave & Gabriel E. Martinez, 2020. "Do political donors have greater access to government officials? Evidence from a FOIA field experiment with US municipalities," Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration, vol. 3(2).
- Jacobson, Elaine Mullaly & Emerson, Robert D., 1989. "The Influences Of Id Ogy And Economic Interests On Dairy Legislation," 1989 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 2, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 270466, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003.
"Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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