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Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution

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  • Norman Frohlich
  • Joe Oppenheimer

Abstract

Vote maximizing candidates for reelection often have an incentive to redistribute income. They target certain constituent groups as recipients for income transfers and others as income losers. Resulting situations bifurcate sharply. Some have characteristics of ‘fairness’ and moderation and others of exploitation. The conditions which lead to these sorts of situations are identified. It is shown that recipients of income transfers need not be central members of the incumbents' coalitions but rather may at times be ‘fence straddlers.’ Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, 1984. "Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 113-131, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:2:p:113-131
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124155
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    2. R. Arnold, 1981. "Legislators, bureaucrats, and locational decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 107-132, January.
    3. Miller, Gary J. & Oppenheimer, Joe A., 1982. "Universalism in Experimental Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 561-574, September.
    4. Meltzer, Allan H & Vellrath, Marc, 1975. "The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency: Some Evidence from Recent Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 781-798, December.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    6. Joe Oppenheimer, 1981. "Legislators, bureaucrats and locational decisions and beyond," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 133-140, January.
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