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Electoral equilibrium in double member districts

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  • Gary Cox

Abstract

The median-voter result, and the issue of stability in electoral competition generally, have been examined from a number of different perspectives. Out of all these examinations, however, only a few focus on institutional variables. This essay demonstrates that the median-voter result is robust under a significant institutional change that entails altering the basic assumption of single-member districts. After developing a model of electoral competition in a two-member, first-two-past-the-post district, I show that, if there are three candidates, the set of Nash equilibria is the set of strategy triples (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), with x 1 =x 2 =x 3 =x*, and such that x* lies between the quantiles of order 1/3 and 2/3. If there are four candidates, I show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists with all candidates adopting a position at the medianvoter's ideal point. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Cox, 1984. "Electoral equilibrium in double member districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 443-451, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:44:y:1984:i:3:p:443-451
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00119692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1972. "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 555-568, June.
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    8. Klain, Maurice, 1955. "A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a Recount and a Reappraisal," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 1105-1119, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Beath & Fotini Christia & Georgy Egorov & Ruben Enikolopov, 2016. "Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 932-968.
    2. Thomas H. Hammond & Christopher K. Butler, 2003. "Some Complex Answers to the Simple Question ‘Do Institutions Matter?’," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 145-200, April.
    3. Andrew Beath & Fotini Christia & Georgy Egorov & Ruben Enikolopov, 2014. "Electoral Rules and the Quality of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," NBER Working Papers 20082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Brian Beach & Daniel B. Jones, 2017. "Gridlock: Ethnic Diversity in Government and the Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 112-136, February.
    5. Dean Lacy & Emerson M. S. Niou, 1998. "Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 89-110, January.

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