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Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees

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  • Elizabeth Hoffman
  • Charles Plott

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  • Elizabeth Hoffman & Charles Plott, 1983. "Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 21-39, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:40:y:1983:i:1:p:21-39
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00174994
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978. "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 146-160, March.
    2. Fiorina, Morris P. & Plott, Charles R., 1978. "Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 575-598, June.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C. & Winer, Mark D., 1978. "The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 599-615, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Kagel & Hankyoung Sung & Eyal Winter, 2010. "Veto power in committees: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June.
    2. Grelak, Eric & Koford, Kenneth, 1997. "A re-examination of the Fiorina-Plott and Eavey voting experiments: How much do cardinal payoffs influence outcomes?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 571-589, April.
    3. Cheryl L. Eavey & Gary J. Miller, 1995. "Subcommittee Agenda Control," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 125-156, April.
    4. Kira Pronin & Jonathan Woon, 2023. "Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 625-645, May.
    5. Plott, Charles R. & Llewellyn, Morgan, 2015. "Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 208-223.
    6. Cheryl L. Eavey, 1991. "Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(4), pages 450-474, October.

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