Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/spr/sochwe9.html
Content
October 2003, Volume 21, Issue 2
- 323-346 Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
by François Maniquet - 347-384 On the informational basis of social choice
by Marc Fleurbaey
August 2003, Volume 21, Issue 1
- 1-19 Political culture and monopoly price determination
by Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan - 21-37 Recoverability of choice functions and binary relations: some duality results
by Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu - 39-61 Farsighted stability in hedonic games
by Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue - 63-71 Extending an order to the power set: The Leximax Criterion
by Miguel A. Ballester & Juan R. De Miguel - 73-93 Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
by Biung-Ghi Ju - 95-111 Impartiality and interpersonal comparisons of variations in well-being
by Edi Karni - 113-116 Appropriate discounting of future utilities need not be the dictatorship of the present: A note on Chichilnisky
by Yew-Kwang Ng - 117-129 Justifiable preferences over opportunity sets
by Somdeb Lahiri - 131-148 The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo
by Sam Bucovetsky - 149-173 General concepts of value restriction and preference majority
by Michel Regenwetter & A.A.J. Marley & Bernard Grofman - 175-178 Book review
by Walter Kanning & Arnald J. Kanning
June 2003, Volume 20, Issue 3
- 353-362 Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis
by Özgür Kıbrıs - 363-370 Positional independence in preference aggregation
by Antonio Quesada - 371-385 Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
by Szilvia Pápai - 387-403 The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games
by Vincent C. H. Chua & H. C. Huang - 405-428 Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
by Gaël Giraud & Céline Rochon - 429-441 Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma
by Drora Karotkin & Jacob Paroush - 443-456 Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: An impossibility and some proposals
by Yew-Kwang Ng & Guang-Zhen Sun & Guang-Zhen Sun - 457-465 How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations
by Fabio Maccheroni & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Massimo Marinacci - 467-475 Flipping and ex post aggregation
by Matthias Hild & Richard Jeffrey & Mathias Risse - 477-494 Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
by Barış Kaymak & M. Remzi Sanver - 495-507 Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
by Semih Koray & Bulent Unel - 509-522 How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox
by Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman - 523-528 Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize
by Gerhard J. Woeginger
March 2003, Volume 20, Issue 2
- 177-187 Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain
by Zvi Safra & Einat Weissengrin - 189-201 Decomposition properties of dual choice functionals
by S. David Promislow & Virginia R. Young - 203-228 On fairness and welfare analysis under uncertainty
by Jean-Paul Chavas & Jay Coggins - 229-242 Analysing a preference and approval profile
by Jean-François Laslier - 243-246 Representing an ordering when the population varies
by John Broome - 247-259 Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation
by Stephen J. Willson - 261-272 Aggregated statistical rankings are arbitrary
by Deanna B. Haunsperger - 273-281 On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems
by Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly - 283-306 On the probabilities of correct or incorrect majority preference relations
by Ilia Tsetlin & Michel Regenwetter - 307-350 From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics
by Yew-Kwang Ng
2003, Volume 20, Issue 1
- 3-25 Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice
by Shasikanta Nandeibam - 27-32 A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules
by Mark Fey - 33-39 Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
by Sang-Chul Suh - 41-48 Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain
by John Bone - 49-75 Finite decentralization in a Tiebout economy with crowding types
by John P. Conley & Stefani Cheri Smith - 77-83 On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result
by Koji Takamiya - 85-118 Power, prosperity and social choice: A review
by Norman Schofield - 119-136 A signaling model of peaceful political change
by Arieh Gavious & Shlomo Mizrahi - 137-154 Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model
by Mauricio Soares Bugarin - 155-166 An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars
by Flavio M. Menezes - 167-176 An axiomatic approach to intergenerational equity
by Toyotaka Sakai
2002, Volume 19, Issue 4
- 709-721 Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with r alternatives
by Edward M. Bolger - 723-749 Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems
by Claus-Jochen Haake & Matthias G. Raith & Francis Edward Su - 751-761 An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite
by Makoto Tanaka & Ryo-ichi Nagahisa - 763-767 Social loss with respect to the core of an economy
by Aldo Montesano - 769-788 Agenda control in coalition formation
by Stéphane Rottier & Francis Bloch - 789-794 A characterization of income distributions in terms of generalized Gini coefficients
by Samuel Kotz & Christian Kleiber - 795-810 On the measurement of unfairness An application to high school attendance in Argentina
by Leonardo C. Gasparini - 811-823 A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
by Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan - 825-844 Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games
by Toru Hokari - 845-867 The apex power measure for directed networks
by René van den Brink - 869-884 Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions
by V. Feltkamp & Javier Arin - 885-900 A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation
by Friedrich Pukelsheim & Albert W. Marshall & Ingram Olkin - 901-919 Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
by César Martinelli - 921-940 Sustainability when capital management has stochastic consequences
by Kjell Arne Brekke & Geir B. Asheim
2002, Volume 19, Issue 3
- 477-488 Neurobiological measurements of cardinal utility: Hedonimeters or learning algorithms?
by Daniel John Zizzo - 489-502 Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points
by Hans Peters & Walter Bossert - 503-512 Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
by William V. Gehrlein - 513-515 Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox
by Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell - 517-532 Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner
by Thom Bezembinder & Hans Maassen - 533-550 Different least square values, different rankings
by Vincent Merlin & Annick Laruelle - 551-567 Ideological versus Downsian political competition
by Ignacio Ortuño Orti´n - 569-580 Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
by Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching - 581-586 A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution
by Walter Trockel - 587-611 A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
by Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel - 613-626 Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking
by Kaoru Ueda - 627-636 Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies
by Anne van den Nouweland & Myrna H. Wooders & S. Tijs - 637-657 Social choice with analytic preferences
by Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark - 659-664 Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
by Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto - 665-680 A method for evaluating the behavior of power indices in weighted plurality games
by C. H. Ueng & Vincent C. H. Chua & H. C. Huang - 681-684 Anonymity, ordinal preference proximity and imposed social choices
by Daniel Eckert & Benjamin Lane - 685-705 The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures
by Shasikanta Nandeibam
April 2002, Volume 19, Issue 2
- 473-475 Book review
by Francesco Sinopoli
2002, Volume 19, Issue 2
- 241-263 Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg - 265-280 On measuring deprivation adjusted for group disparities
by S. Subramanian & Manabi Majumdar - 281-294 Probabilistic cheap talk
by Bhaskar Chakravorti & Bart Taub & John P. Conley - 295-312 Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
by Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal - 313-324 On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
by Arkadii Slinko - 325-348 Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
by Lars Ehlers - 349-367 Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: An experimental examination
by Steven R. Beckman & Buhong Zheng & John P. Formby & W. James Smith - 369-379 Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
by Luis C. Corchón & M. Socorro Puy - 381-413 The proportional random allocation of indivisible units
by Hervé Moulin - 415-430 A simple procedure for finding equitable allocations of indivisible goods
by Dorothea Herreiner & Clemens Puppe - 431-447 Acyclic sets of linear orders: A progress report
by Peter C. Fishburn - 449-454 More on independent decisiveness and Arrow's theorem
by Antonio Quesada - 455-471 Equality of opportunity: A progress report
by John E. Roemer
2002, Volume 19, Issue 1
- 1-27 Progress and conservation under Rawls's maximin principle
by Joaquim Silvestre - 29-55 Evaluation via extended orderings: Empirical findings from Western and Eastern Europe
by Jochen Jungeilges & Wulf Gaertner - 57-67 Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
by Pablo Amorós - 69-93 Multidimensional poverty indices
by Kai-yuen Tsui - 95-111 Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
by Howard Margolis - 113-125 Equitable insurance premium schemes
by Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert - 127-154 Choice correspondences for public goods
by Bettina Klaus & Ton Storcken - 155-173 Lexicographic measurement of the information contained in opportunity sets
by Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg & Jörg Naeve - 175-192 Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
by Dolors Berga - 193-206 On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles
by Fabrice Valognes & Vincent Merlin & Monica Tataru - 207-218 Multilevel interterritorial convergence and additive multidimensional inequality decomposition
by Rafael Salas - 219-236 Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
by Adam Meirowitz
2001, Volume 18, Issue 4
- 619-653 An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
by Salvador Barberà - 655-708 A crash course in implementation theory
by Matthew O. Jackson - 709-735 The probability of ties with scoring methods: Some results
by Thierry Marchant - 737-746 Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations
by Ruth Ben-Yashar & Jacob Paroush - 747-757 The political viability of a negative income tax
by Jon R. Neill - 759-784 Core concepts for share vectors
by Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink - 785-798 Strategyproof single unit award rules
by Szilvia Pápai - 799-816 Horizontal inequity comparisons
by Valentino Dardanoni & Peter Lambert - 817-822 Nondictatorially independent pairs and Pareto
by Robert C. Powers - 823-831 Using elections to represent preferences
by Vicki Knoblauch
2001, Volume 18, Issue 3
- 389-401 An interview with John C. Harsanyi
by Peter J. Hammond & Claude d'Aspremont - 409-414 A nail-biting election
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - 415-430 Analyzing a nail-biting election
by Donald G. Saari - 431-464 The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
by Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal - 465-483 The value of a player in n-person games
by Kjell Hausken & Matthias Mohr - 485-495 Review of Ethics out of Economics by John Broome
by Nicolas Gravel - 497-506 Welfare-reducing growth despite individual and government optimization
by Siang Ng & Yew-Kwang Ng - 507-525 Aggregation of coarse preferences
by Hervé Crès - 527-541 Locating libraries on a street
by Eiichi Miyagawa - 543-553 Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
by H. Reiju Mihara - 555-570 Stable sets and standards of behaviour
by Robert Delver & Herman Monsuur - 571-600 Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review
by Norman Schofield - 601-616 The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
by Joaqui´n Pérez
2001, Volume 18, Issue 2
- 213-226 Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
by Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding - 227-250 On the topological social choice problem
by Charles D. Horvath - 251-267 A linear algebra approach to non-transitive expected utility
by Vesna Omladic & Matjaz Omladic - 269-288 A cognitive model of individual well-being
by Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 289-301 Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures
by Peter Klibanoff - 303-326 Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information
by John H. Nachbar - 327-386 On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
by William Thomson
2001, Volume 18, Issue 1
- 1-22 From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives
by Thomas Schwartz - 23-36 Ranking opportunity sets: An approach based on the preference for flexibility
by Ricardo Arlegi & Jorge Nieto - 37-58 Strategy-proofness and markets
by Mark A. Satterthwaite - 59-64 Social Welfare Functions which preserve distances
by Fritz Grafe & Julius Grafe - 65-78 Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
by Michel Le Breton & John Duggan - 79-89 A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule
by Thomas C. Ratliff - 91-105 A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action
by Arieh Gavious & Shlomo Mizrahi - 107-112 A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
by Valentino Dardanoni - 113-127 Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework
by Josep E. Peris & M. Carmen Sánchez - 129-134 A note on monotonicity in iterated choice functions
by Sylvain J. Durand - 135-153 Core in a simple coalition formation game
by Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi - 155-163 The robustness of optimal organizational architectures: A note on hierarchies and polyarchies
by Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan - 165-178 Poverty orderings: A graphical illustration
by Buhong Zheng - 179-191 More on preference and freedom
by Antonio Romero-Medina - 193-205 Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
by Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein
2000, Volume 17, Issue 4
- 571-599 A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
by Naoki Yoshihara - 601-627 Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
by Philippe De Donder - 629-637 Extended preferences and freedom of choice
by Shmuel Nitzan & Eyal Baharad - 639-653 Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions
by Rolf Aaberge - 655-672 Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
by Francesco De Sinopoli - 673-690 Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the mean
by JosÊ Luis GarcÎa-Lapresta & Bonifacio Llamazares - 691-705 Changes that cause changes
by Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin - 707-738 A historical introduction to normative economics
by Serge-Christophe Kolm - 739-748 Social choice with independent subgroup utility scales
by John A. Weymark & Anna B. Khmelnitskaya
2000, Volume 17, Issue 3
- 381-391 Does the Borda rule provide more than a ranking?
by Thierry Marchant - 393-402 Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
by H. Reiju Mihara - 403-438 A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule
by Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin - 439-461 When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus
by Otto H. Swank & Wilko Letterie & Hendrik P. van Dalen - 463-479 Institutional innovation, contingency and war: A review
by Norman Schofield - 481-506 Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
by Antonio Quesada - 507-521 Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems
by Youngsub Chun - 523-532 Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy
by Sungwhee Shin & Sang-Chul Suh - 533-558 Negatively interdependent preferences
by Efe A. Ok & Levent KoÚkesen - 559-565 A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
by Mathieu Martin - 567-569 Book review
by Maurice Salles
2000, Volume 17, Issue 2
- 189-199 A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
by Ruth Ben-Yashar & Jacob Paroush - 201-215 An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
by Flip Klijn - 217-222 Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games
by Indrajit Ray - 223-239 Intermediate inequality and welfare
by Coral del RÎo & Javier Ruiz-Castillo - 241-246 Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox
by Hans Gersbach - 247-267 Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - 269-282 Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
by Jean-FranÚois Laslier - 283-292 Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
by Jean-FranÚois Laslier - 293-320 Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach
by Nicolas Gravel & Jean-Francois Laslier & Alain Trannoy - 321-336 Welfarism and information invariance
by Walter Bossert - 337-365 Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
by A. S. Tangian - 367-375 Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
by Klaus Nehring
2000, Volume 17, Issue 1
- 3-24 Information and preference aggregation
by Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly - 25-31 Public information and social choice
by Hans Gersbach - 33-43 On the structure of simple preference-based choice functions
by Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Kunal Sengupta - 45-53 Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution
by Marco Mariotti - 55-68 An optimal auction perspective on lobbying
by Richard T. Boylan - 69-83 Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
by Sandeep Baliga & Sandro Brusco - 85-93 Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
by John Duggan & Thomas Schwartz - 95-115 Interpersonal comparisons of utility and the policy paralysis problem
by Michael Mandler - 117-124 The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis
by Jon R. Neill - 125-141 Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
by Guoqiang Tian - 143-155 Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
by H. C. Huang & Vincent C. H. Chua - 157-178 Representatives and districts
by Brendan O'Flaherty - 179-188 Book Review
by Donald G. Saari
1999, Volume 16, Issue 4
- 513-532 Comparison functions and choice correspondences
by Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-Francois Laslier - 533-555 Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model
by Richard Ball - 557-567 Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
by Lars-Gunnar Svensson - 569-583 Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation
by Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet