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Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

Author

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  • John H. Nachbar

    (Department of Economics, Washington University, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA)

Abstract

In Nachbar [20] and, more definitively, Nachbar [22], I argued that, for a large class of discounted infinitely repeated games of complete information (i.e. stage game payoff functions are common knowledge), it is impossible to construct a Bayesian learning theory in which player beliefs are simultaneously weakly cautious, symmetric, and consistent. The present paper establishes a similar impossibility theorem for repeated games of incomplete information, that is, for repeated games in which stage game payoff functions are private information.

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Nachbar, 2001. "Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 303-326.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:303-326
    Note: Received: 15 October 1997/Accepted: 17 March 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
    2. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2022. "Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 321-352, August.
    3. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2015. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 93-105.
    4. Dean Foster & H Peyton Young, 1999. "On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents," Economics Working Paper Archive 423, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2001.
    5. John H. Nachbar, 2005. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 459-480, March.
    6. Young, H. Peyton, 2002. "On the limits to rational learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 791-799, May.
    7. Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 151, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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