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On fairness and welfare analysis under uncertainty

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  • Jean-Paul Chavas
  • Jay Coggins

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of fairness, uncertainty, and a “veil of ignorance” in efficient resource allocation. It focuses on the choice of private and public goods, the method of financing, as well as the choice of information available for public decision-making. A fair-equivalent and Pareto efficient allocation is presented using a maximin criterion defined in terms of individual willingness-to-pay. The paper investigates the role of information in public decision making in terms of its implications for both efficiency and fairness. While better information typically generates improved efficiency, it can also contribute to unfair allocations. The effects of asymmetric information are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Chavas & Jay Coggins, 2003. "On fairness and welfare analysis under uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(2), pages 203-228, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:2:p:203-228
    DOI: 10.1007/s003550200176
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Courtault, Jean-Michel & Crettez, Bertrand & Hayek, Naila, 2008. "A note on Boiteux' surplus function and dual Pareto efficiency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 439-447, November.
    4. Scott Steele, 2002. "Gender-Based Advantage: A Model of Emerging and Constructed Opportunities," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 77-97.

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