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Social choice with analytic preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Le Breton

    (Université de la Méditérranée, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, 14, Avenue Jules Ferry, 13621, Aix en Provence, France)

  • John A. Weymark

    (Department of Economics, Box 1819, Station B, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA)

Abstract

Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial preferences. When either of these preference domains is combined with an agenda domain consisting of compact sets with nonempty interiors, strengthened versions of the Arrovian social choice correspondence axioms are shown to be consistent. To help establish the economic possibility theorem, an ordinal version of the Analytic Continuation Principle is developed.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Social choice with analytic preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 637-657.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:637-657
    Note: Received: 4 July 2000/Accepted: 2 April 2001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. BOSSERT, Walter & WEYMARK, J.A., 2006. "Social Choice: Recent Developments," Cahiers de recherche 01-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
    3. Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2009. "Oligarchies in spatial environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 250-256, March.
    4. Grigoriev, A. & van de Klundert, J., 2001. "Throughput rate optimization in high multiplicity sequencing problems," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Frederik S. Herzberg, 2013. "The (im)possibility of collective risk measurement: Arrovian aggregation of variational preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 69-92, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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