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Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications

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  • Biung-Ghi Ju

Abstract

We identify general domain properties that induce the non-existence of efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial rules in the 2-agent exchange economy. Applying these properties, we establish impossibility results in several restricted domains; for example, the intertemporal exchange problem (without saving technology) with preferences represented by the discounted sum of a temporal utility function, the “risk sharing problem” with risk averse expected utility preferences, the CES-preference domain, etc. None of the earlier studies applies to these examples. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

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  • Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:1:p:73-93
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0202-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Momi, Takeshi, 2017. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    2. Takeshi Momi, 2020. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 325-367, August.
    3. Özgür Kıbrıs & İpek Tapkı, 2014. "A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(3), pages 163-189, September.
    4. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2014. "Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-39.
    5. Momi, Takeshi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1237-1254.
    6. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 2007. "Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 103-108, July.
    7. Mridu Goswami, 2015. "Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 389-422, February.
    8. , Prabal & , & ,, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    9. Leroux, Jistin, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency Are Incompatible in Production Economies," Working Papers 2004-07, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    10. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2005. "Strategy-proof risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-254, February.
    11. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 335-340, December.
    12. Takeshi Momi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 787-792, March.
    13. Mridu Prabal Goswami, 2014. "Equal Treatment of Equals in Classical Quasilinear Exchange Economies," Working Papers 1403, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    14. Jin Li & Jingyi Xue, 2013. "Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 597-622, November.

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