IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v17y2000i2p217-222.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games

Author

Listed:
  • Indrajit Ray

    (Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK)

Abstract

The relationships between the consistency (CONS) principle and two other axioms, dummy (DUM) and independence of irrelevant strategies (IIS) for solution concepts on families of strategic form games are studied. If a solution satisfies DUM and IIS, then it also satisfies CONS (Peleg and Tijs 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor IIS as shown in two simple examples, using the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. The axiom of weak dummy (WDUM) is introduced. WDUM, along with IIS, implies CONS. Moreover, CONS implies WDUM.

Suggested Citation

  • Indrajit Ray, 2000. "Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 217-222.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:217-222
    Note: Received: 13 August 1998/Accepted: 19 January 1999
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/0017002/00170217.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Concept of the Core of Games in Effectiveness Form," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-15, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    2. repec:hal:journl:hal-04797842 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Lardon, Aymeric, 2021. "Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-38.
    4. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core," Working Papers halshs-01930836, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:217-222. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.