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Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism

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  • Guoqiang Tian

    (Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA)

Abstract

This paper considers the issue of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when coalition patterns, preferences, and endowments are unknown to the designer. It will be noted that the mechanism presented here is feasible and continuous, and the implementation result is obtained without defining an artificial preference profile on prices announced by individuals. In addition, unlike most existing Nash-implementing mechanisms which need to distinguish the case of two agents from that of three or more agents, this paper provides a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Guoqiang Tian, 2000. "Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 125-141.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:1:p:125-141
    Note: Received: 19 August 1997/Accepted: 16 November 1998
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    Cited by:

    1. Shinohara, Ryusuke, 2005. "Coalition-proofness and dominance relations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 174-179, November.

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