Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/spr/sochwe10.html
Content
1999, Volume 16, Issue 4
- 585-597 No-envy and Arrow's conditions
by Vincenzo DenicolÔ - 599-614 The distribution problem and Rawlsian reasoning
by Bertil Tungodden - 615-627 The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
by Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel - 629-638 On rationalizability of choice functions: A characterization of the median
by Wulf Gaertner & Yongsheng Xu - 639-661 Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
by David A. Smith - 663-672 Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model
by David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks - 673-674 Book Review
by John H. Nachbar
1999, Volume 16, Issue 3
- 349-371 On the power of poverty orderings
by Buhong Zheng - 373-394 Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions
by William Thomson - 395-407 Rationalizable solutions to pure population problems
by Walter Bossert & David Donaldson & Charles Blackorby - 409-427 On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes
by Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm - 429-439 On the separability of assembly preferences
by Jean-Pierre BenoÏt & Lewis A. Kornhauser - 441-444 Pareto's compensation principle
by Murray C. Kemp & Paul Pezanis-Christou - 445-470 The C1 topology on the space of smooth preference profiles
by Norman Schofield - 471-490 Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 491-512 Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach
by Iñaki García & Esther Gutiérrez & Emilio Calvo
1999, Volume 16, Issue 2
- 171-182 The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings
by Adrian Van Deemen - 183-196 Intersecting generalized Lorenz curves and the Gini index
by Claudio Zoli - 197-216 Utility, informed preference, or happiness: Following Harsanyi's argument to its logical conclusion
by Yew-Kwang Ng - 217-231 Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
by Josep E. Peris & BegoÓa Subiza - 233-258 Using equivalent income of equivalent adults to rank income distributions
by Udo Ebert - 259-272 Choice rules with fuzzy preferences: Some characterizations
by Kunal Sengupta - 273-278 A characterization of utilitarianism without the transitivity axiom
by Vincenzo DenicolÔ - 279-320 Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
by HervÊ Moulin - 321-336 Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
by Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ - 337-346 Arbitrage and global cones: Another counterexample
by Frank H. Page Jr. & (**), Myrna H. Wooders & Paulo K. Monteiro
1999, Volume 16, Issue 1
- 1-16 Economic development and the transition to democracy a formal model
by Baizhu Chen & Yi Feng - 17-40 Consequences, opportunities, and procedures
by Kotaro Suzumura - 41-63 On the multi-preference approach to evaluating opportunities
by Klaus Nehring & Clemens Puppe - 65-79 Aggregation of individuals' preference intensities into social preference intensity
by Charles M. Harvey - 81-97 Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences
by M. Carmen SÂnchez & Josep E. Peris - 99-119 Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets
by Guoqiang Tian - 121-136 Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
by Shinji Ohseto - 137-143 A smallest tournament for which the Banks set and the Copeland set are disjoint
by Olivier Hudry - 145-157 Multidimensional inequality and multidimensional generalized entropy measures: An axiomatic derivation
by Kai-yuen Tsui - 159-167 An extension of a theorem on the aggregation of separable preferences
by Laurent Vidu
1998, Volume 15, Issue 4
- 481-488 When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?
by Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush - 489-508 Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates
by Susan O. Griffin & Joyendu Bhadury & Lakshmi S. Narasimhan & (*), Paul M. Griffin - 509-519 An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
by Shasikanta Nandeibam - 521-542 Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
by Amrita Dhillon - 543-558 Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods
by Yves Sprumont - 559-562 The number of weak orderings of a finite set
by Ralph W. Bailey - 563-566 Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem
by Vincenzo DenicolÔ - 567-582 Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value
by (*), Gerard van der Laan & RenÊ van den Brink - 583-592 Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle
by Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell
1998, Volume 15, Issue 3
- 321-332 An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem
by Edi Karni & John A. Weymark - 333-350 Voting paradoxes and referenda
by Hannu Nurmi - 351-358 The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
by William V. Gehrlein - 359-369 The structure of fuzzy preferences: Social choice implications
by Gregory Richardson - 371-382 Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty
by Nicolas Gravel - 383-411 Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter SudhÃlter - 413-421 Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite
by Marco Mariotti - 423-443 Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering
by Bernard Grofman & Michel Regenwetter - 445-454 Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
by Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber - 455-467 Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
by Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding
1998, Volume 15, Issue 2
- 161-185 Aggregation of smooth preferences
by Norman Schofield - 187-199 Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result
by Gerhard Glomm & B. Ravikumar - 201-209 Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules
by Susan H. Gensemer & Lu Hong & Jerry S. Kelly - 211-236 The paradox of multiple elections
by Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour - 237-238 A strong paradox of multiple elections
by Marco Scarsini - 239-261 Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
by Donald G. Saari - 263-287 The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach
by Efe A. Ok & Laurence Kranich - 289-296 The Borda count and agenda manipulation
by Michael Dummett - 297-311 Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
by Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken - 313-319 book review: Book Review
by Marc Fleurbaey
1997, Volume 15, Issue 1
- 1-14 The Lorenz zonotope and multivariate majorizations
by Gleb Koshevoy - 15-20 Stay away from fair coins: A Condorcet jury theorem
by Jacob Paroush - 21-30 Equity, continuity, and myopia: A generalization of Diamond's impossibility theorem
by Tomoichi Shinotsuka - 31-56 Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
by Shlomo Weber - 57-66 The replacement principle in economies with indivisible goods
by William Thomson - 67-80 Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
by Bezalel Peleg - 81-93 Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics
by David Epstein - 95-112 Objective measures of well-being and the cooperative production problem
by FrÊdÊric Gaspart - 113-119 Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims
by Carmen Herrero - 121-139 Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
by Dimitrios Diamantaras & Robert P. Gilles - 141-159 An extension of Bowen's dynamic voting rule to many dimensions
by Pierre de Trenqualye
1997, Volume 14, Issue 4
- 471-478 Hansson's theorem for generalized social welfare functions: an extension
by John Duggan - 479-502 Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
by John E. Roemer - 503-512 Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
by H. Reiju Mihara - 513-525 Non-cooperative implementation of the core
by Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra - 527-543 A note on the existence of progressive tax structures
by Efe A. Ok - 545-562 Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition
by Bernard Grofman & Samuel Merrill III.
1997, Volume 14, Issue 3
- 363-377 Equitable agendas: agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
by K. B. Reid - 379-401 Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces
by T. Storcken & H. Peters & H. v. d. Stel & W. Peremans - 403-425 Rational choice and revealed preference without binariness
by Klaus Nehring - 427-438 A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
by Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn - 439-447 Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
by Sang-Chul Suh - 449-464 Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote: A comment
by Randolph Sloof - 465-467 Book Review: John Broome: Counting the Cost of Global Warming. The White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1992
by Peter J. Hammond - 468-470 Book Review: W.A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, N.J. Schofield (eds.): Social choice, welfare and ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.ISBN 0-521-44340
by Donald E. Campbell
1997, Volume 14, Issue 2
- 147-160 Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective
by Geoffrey Heal - 161-198 Market arbitrage, social choice and the core
by Graciela Chichilnisky - 199-209 Topological and discrete social choice: in a search of a theory
by Yuliy M. Baryshnikov - 211-232 Informational geometry of social choice
by Donald G. Saari - 233-243 Topological methods in social choice: an overview
by Paras Mehta - 245-248 A note on continuous social choice
by Yuqing Zhou - 249-257 Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps (*)
by Heine Rasmussen - 259-294 The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)
by G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal - 295-302 Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules
by Gleb Koshevoy - 303-318 Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results
by Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal - 319-332 Topological aggregation, the case of an infinite population
by Luc Lauwers - 333-343 Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents
by E. IndurÂin & J. C. Candeal & G. Chichilnisky - 345-356 Continuity and equity with infinite horizons
by Luc Lauwers - 357-358 A note on weak \infty-Chichilnisky rules
by Luc Lauwers - 359-361 Some issues related to the topological aggregation of preferences: addendum (*)
by Esteban Induráin & José Ramón Uriarte & Juan Carlos Candeal
1996, Volume 14, Issue 1
- 1-21 The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: a game theoretic approach
by Koichi Suga & Akira Okada & Kenichi Sakakibara - 23-45 Election of vice-president and adding new members to representative bodies
by Andranick S. Tanguiane - 47-56 Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
by James Schummer - 57-64 Equitable opportunities in economic environments
by Laurence Kranich - 65-78 Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems
by John P. Conley & Simon Wilkie & Richard P. McLean - 79-96 Objective interpersonal comparisons of utility
by Kevin Roberts - 97-112 Opportunity sets and individual well-being
by Walter Bossert - 113-124 Acyclic sets of linear orders
by Peter Fishburn - 125-128 Outranking methods for multicriterion decision making: Arrow's and Raynaud's conjecture
by Zachary F. Lansdowne - 129-145 Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods
by John C. Harsanyi
1996, Volume 13, Issue 4
- 383-395 Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate
by Ryo-ichi Nagahisa - 397-417 Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - 419-432 Incomplete information and incentives to free ride
by Mehmet Bac - 433-444 Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
by Lu Hong - 445-450 Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods
by Koichi Tadenuma - 451-455 Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments
by Michel Le Breton & Guillaume Hollard - 457-465 Voting power when using preference ballots
by Duncan J. Melville & Deanna B. Haunsperger - 467-478 Implementation in generic environments
by Arunava Sen & James Bergin - 479-486 Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules
by Drora Karotkin - 487-496 Social welfare functions and fairness
by Edi Karni
June 1996, Volume 13, Issue 3
- 381-381 Erratum
by Graciela Chichilnisky
1996, Volume 13, Issue 3
- 259-267 Majority-consistent preference orderings
by John Craven - 269-274 A note on restricted majority rules: invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness
by Drora Karotkin & Shmuel Nitzan - 275-289 Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments
by Sanjay Srivastava & Michael A. Trick - 291-303 Improvement indices of well-being (*)
by Kai-yuen Tsui - 305-318 Transitivity and fuzzy preferences
by Rajat Deb & Manabendra Dasgupta - 319-325 Reconciling interpersonal comparability and the intensity of preference for the utility sum rule
by Ben Fine - 327-342 Partially efficient voting by committees
by Ken-Ichi Shimomura - 343-355 Redistribution and compensation (*)
by Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert - 357-364 Actions of symmetry groups
by Graciela Chichilnisky - 365-380 The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
by Thom Bezembinder
April 1996, Volume 13, Issue 2
- 127-127 Special issue: incommensurability and value
by Maurice Salles - 129-150 Quasi-orderings and population ethics
by Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson - 151-182 The theory of justice
by Serge-Christophe Kolm - 183-200 The nature and measurement of freedom
by Patrick Suppes - 201-213 Explaining risky choices without assuming preferences
by Chris Starmer - 215-230 Social choice with procedural preferences
by Sven Hansson - 231-257 An axiomatic approach to sustainable development
by Graciela Chichilnisky
January 1996, Volume 13, Issue 1
- 1-10 A robust theory of resource allocation
by Graciela Chichilnisky - 11-16 A remark on a social choice problem
by Beth Allen - 25-41 Finite sensibility and utility functions
by Gerhard Sichelstiel & Fritz Söllner - 43-50 Equilibrium in abstract political economies: with an application to a public good economy with voting
by Hideo Konishi - 51-59 New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
by Nir Dagan - 61-74 Bargaining with set-valued disagreement
by Kaushik Basu - 75-93 Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier - 95-112 Arrow theorems in mixed goods, stochastic, and dynamic economic environments
by James Redekop - 113-126 Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
by Carmen Bevia
October 1984, Volume 1, Issue 3
- 165-175 On interpersonal utility comparisons
by M. Kaneko