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Positional independence in preference aggregation

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  • Antonio Quesada

Abstract

If, for strict preferences, a unique choice function (CF) is used to aggregate preferences position-wise then the resulting social welfare function (SWF) is dictatorial. This suggests that the task performed by non-dictatorial SWFs must be “more complex” than just selecting an alternative from a list using a single criterion. This is because the information required by non-dictatorial SWFs to aggregate preferences cannot be compressed into a CF. It is also shown that the attempt to reduce the working of a SWF to the working of a CF involves the adoption of certain positional requirements, whose relationship with the conditions in Arrow's theorem is established. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Quesada, 2003. "Positional independence in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 363-370, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:3:p:363-370
    DOI: 10.1007/s003550200187
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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato, 2015. "Weak Independence and Social Semi-Orders," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 311-321, September.
    2. Quesada, Antonio, 2005. "A positional version of Arrow's theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1053-1059, December.
    3. Antonio Quesada, 2009. "Up/Downward Preference Aggregation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 857-873, October.

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