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Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox

Author

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  • Hans Gersbach

    (UniversitÄt Heidelberg, Alfred-Weber-Institut, Grabengasse 14, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany)

Abstract

In this paper we examine the strategic implications of collective acquisition of information in a committee or in a legislature. We show that the prospect of acquiring information can harm a majority even if information is only available by the support of a majority. Moreover, the model provides two results about incentives to acquire information. First, for policies with high distributional uncertainties, we expect that less information is acquired collectively by a committee than for other policies. Second, for policies that show only size uncertainty, our model predicts intense efforts to acquire information collectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2000. "Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 241-246.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:241-246
    Note: Received: 20 January 1997/Accepted: 15 February 1999
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    Cited by:

    1. Binswanger, Johannes & Oechslin, Manuel, 2020. "Better statistics, better economic policies?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    2. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Marc Möller, 2016. "Team adaptation," CEP Discussion Papers dp1421, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Keith E. Schnakenberg, 2017. "The downsides of information transmission and voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 43-59, October.
    4. Huber, Jurgen, 2007. "`J'-shaped returns to timing advantage in access to information - Experimental evidence and a tentative explanation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 2536-2572, August.

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