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Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems

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  • Youngsub Chun

    (Division of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea)

Abstract

A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public projects and determining side payments among agents to cover the cost of the project, assuming each agent has quasi-linear preferences. We first investigate the logical relations between various axioms in this context. They are: agreement, separability, population solidarity, consistency, converse consistency, and population-and-cost solidarity. Also, on the basis of these axioms, we present alternative characterizations of egalitarian solutions; each solution assigns to each agent an equal share of the surplus derived from the public project over some reference utility level, but uses a different method to compute the reference utility level.

Suggested Citation

  • Youngsub Chun, 2000. "Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 507-521.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:507-521
    Note: Received: 18 May 1998/Accepted: 1 July 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jerry Green, 2005. "Compensatory transfers in two-player decision problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(2), pages 159-180, June.
    2. Youngsub Chun & Inkee Jang & Biung-Ghi Ju, 2014. "Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 577-589, October.
    3. Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018. "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 734-779.
    4. Kim, Sunyoung & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Chun, Youngsub, 2015. "The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 69-75.
    5. Moulin, Hervé, 2008. "Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 567-587, July.
    6. Hervé Moulin, 2007. "On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 266-283, May.
    7. Yuan Ju, 2013. "Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer–counteroffer mechanism with two players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 501-520, May.
    8. Moulin, Herve, 2005. "Split-Proof Probabilistic Scheduling," Working Papers 2004-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    9. Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2006. "Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 637-652, September.

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