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Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

Author

Listed:
  • Lin Zhou

    (Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, HONG KONG)

  • Stephen Ching

    (Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, HONG KONG)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:569-580
    Note: Received: 24 January 2001/Accepted: 19 March 2001
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