IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v40y2013i2p353-358.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The original Borda count and partial voting

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Emerson

Abstract

In a Borda count, bc, M. de Borda suggested the last preference cast should receive 1 point, the voter’s penultimate ranking should get 2 points, and so on. Today, however, points are often awarded to (first, second,..., last) preferences cast as per (n, n−1, ..., 1) or more frequently, (n −1, n−2,..., 0). If partial voting is allowed, and if a first preference is to be given n or n − 1 points regardless of how many preferences the voter casts, he/she will be incentivised to rank only one option/candidate. If everyone acts in this way, the bc metamorphoses into a plurality vote... which de Borda criticized at length. If all the voters submit full ballots, the outcome—social choice or ranking—will be the same under any of the above three counting procedures. In the event of one or more persons submitting a partial vote, however, outcomes may vary considerably. This preliminary paper suggests research should consider partial voting. The author examines the consequences of the various rules so far advocated and then purports that M. de Borda, in using his formula, was perhaps more astute than the science has hitherto recognised. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Emerson, 2013. "The original Borda count and partial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 353-358, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:353-358
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, September.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, September.
    3. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, September.
    4. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Monaco, Roberto & Bergaentzlé, Claire & Leiva Vilaplana, Jose Angel & Ackom, Emmanuel & Nielsen, Per Sieverts, 2024. "Digitalization of power distribution grids: Barrier analysis, ranking and policy recommendations," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    2. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 79-97, July.
    3. Mónica de Castro-Pardo & Fernando Pérez-Rodríguez & José María Martín-Martín & João C. Azevedo, 2019. "Planning for Democracy in Protected Rural Areas: Application of a Voting Method in a Spanish-Portuguese Reserve," Land, MDPI, vol. 8(10), pages 1-17, October.
    4. Wei-Chao Lin & Ching Chen, 2021. "Novel World University Rankings Combining Academic, Environmental and Resource Indicators," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(24), pages 1-15, December.
    5. Junya Wang & Yi-Jiao Zhang & Cong Xu & Jiaze Li & Jiachen Sun & Jiarong Xie & Ling Feng & Tianshou Zhou & Yanqing Hu, 2024. "Reconstructing the evolution history of networked complex systems," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, December.
    6. Pedro García-del-Valle-y-Durán & Eduardo Gamaliel Hernandez-Martinez & Guillermo Fernández-Anaya, 2022. "The Greatest Common Decision Maker: A Novel Conflict and Consensus Analysis Compared with Other Voting Procedures," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(20), pages 1-39, October.
    7. Da Col, Giacomo & Teppan, Erich C., 2022. "Industrial-size job shop scheduling with constraint programming," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 9(C).
    8. Jeisson Prieto & Rafael Malagón & Jonatan Gomez & Elizabeth León, 2021. "Urban Vulnerability Assessment for Pandemic Surveillance—The COVID-19 Case in Bogotá, Colombia," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, March.
    9. Rudiah Md Hanafiah & Nur Hazwani Karim & Noorul Shaiful Fitri Abdul Rahman & Saharuddin Abdul Hamid & Ahmed Maher Mohammed, 2022. "An Innovative Risk Matrix Model for Warehousing Productivity Performance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-21, March.
    10. Terzopoulou, Zoi & Endriss, Ulle, 2021. "The Borda class," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 31-40.
    11. Kevan W. Lamm & Alyssa Powell & Abigail Borron & Keith Atkins & Stephanie Hollifield, 2022. "Insights into Rural Stress: Using the Community Capitals Framework to Help Inform Rural Policies and Interventions," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-12, May.
    12. Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L. & Fraenkel, Jon, 2017. "Finding the Threshold of Exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: Illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 52-56.
    13. Laruelle, Annick, 2021. "Voting to select projects in participatory budgeting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(2), pages 598-604.
    14. Wen Li & Yicheng Ye & Nanyan Hu & Xianhua Wang & Qihu Wang, 2019. "Real-Time Warning and Risk Assessment of Tailings Dam Disaster Status Based on Dynamic Hierarchy-Grey Relation Analysis," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-14, April.
    15. Fink, Andreas & Gerhards, Patrick, 2021. "Negotiation mechanisms for the multi-agent multi-mode resource investment problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 295(1), pages 261-274.
    16. Selim baha Yildiz & Abdelbari El khamlichi, 2017. "The Performance Ranking of Emerging Markets Islamic Indices Using Risk Adjusted Performance Measures," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 63-78.
    17. Floreale, Giovanni & Baraldi, Piero & Lu, Xuefei & Rossetti, Paolo & Zio, Enrico, 2024. "Sensitivity analysis by differential importance measure for unsupervised fault diagnostics," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).
    18. Neal D. Hulkower & John Neatrour, 2019. "The Power of None," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(1), pages 21582440198, March.
    19. Andrew C. Eggers, 2021. "A diagram for analyzing ordinal voting systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 143-171, January.
    20. Aledo, Juan A. & Gámez, Jose A. & Molina, David, 2016. "Using extension sets to aggregate partial rankings in a flexible setting," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 290(C), pages 208-223.
    21. Egli, Florian, 2020. "Renewable energy investment risk: An investigation of changes over time and the underlying drivers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    22. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Working Papers hal-03632662, HAL.
    23. Hülya Yürekli & Öyküm Esra Yiğit & Okan Bulut & Min Lu & Ersoy Öz, 2022. "Exploring Factors That Affected Student Well-Being during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Comparison of Data-Mining Approaches," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(18), pages 1-16, September.
    24. D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2022. "Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 365-391, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
    2. Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 25-28, June.
    3. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2022. "The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 427-447, October.
    4. Donald G. Saari, 2019. "Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 133-144, April.
    5. Aki Lehtinen, 2011. "A welfarist critique of social choice theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 359-381, July.
    6. Piggins, Ashley & Salerno, Gillian, 2016. "Sen cycles and externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 25-27.
    7. Manzoor Ahmad Zahid & Harrie de Swart, 2015. "Experimental Results about Linguistic Voting," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 184-201, December.
    8. Donald Saari, 2011. "Source of complexity in the social and managerial sciences: an extended Sen’s theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 609-620, October.
    9. Lingfang (Ivy) Li & Donald Saari, 2008. "Sen’s theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 393-413, October.
    10. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2022. "Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(3), pages 1296-1316, May.
    11. Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January.
    12. Wu-Hsiung Huang, 2014. "Singularity and Arrow’s paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 671-706, March.
    13. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Arrow’s decisive coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 463-505, March.
    14. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    15. Herrade Igersheim, 2005. "Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(13), pages 1-6.
    16. Thomas Ratliff & Donald Saari, 2014. "Complexities of electing diverse committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 55-71, June.
    17. Abhijit Chandra & Sunanda Roy, 2013. "On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1143-1158, April.
    18. Leo Katz, 2010. "A Theory of Loopholes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-31, January.
    19. Shin Sato, 2012. "On strategy-proof social choice under categorization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 455-471, March.
    20. Antoinette Baujard, 2006. "L'estimation des préférences individuelles en vue de la décision publique. Problèmes, paradoxes, enjeux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 175(4), pages 51-63.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:353-358. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.