IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v20y2003i1p3-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice

Author

Listed:
  • Shasikanta Nandeibam

    (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK)

Abstract

This paper considers the distribution of coalitional influence under probabilistic social choice functions which are randomized social choice rules that allow social indifference by mapping each combination of a preference profile and a feasible set to a social choice lottery over all possible choice sets from the feasible set. When there are at least four alternatives in the universal set and ex-post Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and regularity are imposed, we show that: (i) there is a system of additive coalitional weights such that the weight of each coalition is its power to be decisive in every two-alternative feasble set; and (ii) for each combination of a feasible proper subset of the universal set and a preference profile, the society can be partioned in such a way that for each coalition in this partition, the probability of society's choice set being contained in the union of the best sets of its members is equal to the coalition's power or weight. It is further shown that, for feasible proper subsets of the universal set, the probability of society's choice set containing a pair of alternatives that are not jointly present in anyone's best set is zero. Our results remain valid even when the universal set itself becomes feasible provided some additional conditions hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2003. "Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 3-25.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:1:p:3-25
    Note: Received: 10 May 1999/Accepted: 18 June 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/3020001/30200003.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Indraneel Dasgupta, 2011. "Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 643-658, October.
    2. Saralees Nadarajah, 2009. "The Pareto optimality distribution," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(6), pages 993-998, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:1:p:3-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.