Jacques Lawarree
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021.
"Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
8863, CESifo.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021. "Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 179-206, March.
Cited by:
- Shachat, Jason & Walker, Matthew J. & Wei, Lijia, 2024.
"Contingent payments in procurement interactions: Experimental evidence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
- Matthew J. Walker & Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2022. "Contingent Payments in Procurement Interactions - Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 22-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Hernando, Andres & Villena, Mauricio & Apablaza, Valentina, 2023. "Optimal Bidding for a Bundle of Power Transmission Infrastructure Works," MPRA Paper 120849, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Apr 2024.
- Matthew J. Walker & Elena Katok & Jason Shachat, 2020.
"Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage,"
Working Papers
20-34, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Matthew J. Walker & Elena Katok & Jason Shachat, 2023. "Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3492-3515, June.
- Murali Agastya & Oleksii Birulin, 2023. "Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 660-698, May.
- Downs, Justin, 2024. "Screening, overconfidence, and competition’s effect on market efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Alexander Rodivilov, 2018.
"Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
7310, CESifo.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques & Rodivilov, Alexander, 2020. "Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
Cited by:
- Xu Tan & Quan Wen, 2020. "Information acquisition and voting with heterogeneous experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1063-1092, December.
- Wei Zhang & Long Gao & Mohammad Zolghadr & Dawei Jian & Mohsen ElHafsi, 2023. "Dynamic incentives for sustainable contract farming," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(7), pages 2049-2067, July.
- Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
- Rodivilov, Alexander, 2021. "A note on robust procurement contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2013.
"Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4497, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Troy J Scott, 2011. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," Working Papers UWEC-2011-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
Cited by:
- Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes, 2013.
"Subjective evaluation versus public information,"
Discussion Papers
2013/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helmut Bester & Johannes Münster, 2016. "Subjective evaluation versus public information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(4), pages 723-753, April.
- Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Subjective Evaluation versus Public Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 399, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017.
"The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio, 2015. "The Threat of Corruption and the Optimal Supervisory Task," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-37, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Gambacorta, Leonardo & Khalil, Fahad & Parigi, Bruno, 2022.
"Big Techs vs Banks,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
17649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Leonardo Gambacorta & Fahad Khalil & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2022. "Big Techs vs Banks," BIS Working Papers 1037, Bank for International Settlements.
- Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & Teck Yong Tan, 2016. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile," NBER Working Papers 22156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & Victoria Valle Lara & Christian Zehnder, 2020. "Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture," NBER Working Papers 27857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2013.
"Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats,"
Working Papers
UWEC-2013-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts offered by bureaucrats," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 4511, CESifo.
Cited by:
- Simona Grassi & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2016.
"Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
wp2016-005, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Simona Grassi & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2016. "Information acquisition, referral, and organization," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 935-960, November.
- Simona Grassi & Ching-To Albert Ma, 2015. "Information Acquisition, Referral, and Organization," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Nilssen, Tore & Kundu, Tapas, 2018.
"Delegation of Regulation,"
Memorandum
12/2017, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Tapas Kundu & Tore Nilssen, 2017. "Delegation of Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 6589, CESifo.
- Tapas Kundu & Tore Nilssen, 2020. "Delegation of Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 445-482, September.
- Tapas Kundu & Tore Nilssen, 2017. "Delegation of Regulation," Working Papers 201703, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
- Wang, Dan & Wang, Jiancheng & Hao, Peng & Ren, Qiyu, 2024. "A powerful local government's optimal discretion in simple menu contract of monopoly regulation," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 280-300.
- Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
- Liu, Ting & Albert Ma, Ching-to & Mak, Henry Y., 2018.
"Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 296-313.
- Ting Liu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Henry Y. Mak, 2017. "Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2018-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Ting Liu & Ching-To Albert Ma & Henry Y. Mak, 2015. "Incentives for Motivated Experts in a Partnership," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-006, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Suraj Prasad & Marcus Tomaino, 2020. "Resources and culture in organizations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 854-872, October.
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2009.
"On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires,"
Working Papers
UWEC-2008-24-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2009. "On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 281-306, June.
Cited by:
- Bing Ye & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Competitive contracts with productive information gathering," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 1-17, May.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2007.
"Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1993, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Sungho Yun, 2009. "Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," Working Papers UWEC-2007-11-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2009.
Cited by:
- J. Atsu Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2007.
"Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid,"
Working Papers
0702, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Ouattara, Bazoumana & Amegashie, J. Atsu & Strobl, Eric, 2009. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Frankfurt a.M. 2009 24, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- J. Atsu Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," CESifo Working Paper Series 1996, CESifo.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu & Ouattara, Bazoumanna & Strobl, Eric, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," MPRA Paper 3158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2007.
- Bond Philip, 2009. "Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-34, November.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2004.
"Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment,"
Working Papers
UWEC-2003-02-FC, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006. "Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2005-09-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/245733, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
Cited by:
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022.
"Frequent audits and honest audits,"
UB School of Economics Working Papers
2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
- Wai‐Hong Ho & Yong Wang, 2013. "Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment, and Economic Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(2), pages 611-633, May.
- Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
- Martimort, David & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2015.
"Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10925, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2016. "Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 85-100.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2016. "Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness," Post-Print halshs-01328626, HAL.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2014. "Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness," CEIS Research Paper 317, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 18 Jul 2014.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2014. "Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 14/325, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2016. "Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01328626, HAL.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2014. "Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness," IEFE Working Papers 67, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
- Ho, Shirley J. & Mallick, Sushanta K., 2015. "A Copayment Auditing Scheme for Financial Misreporting," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 53-74.
- De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017.
"The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio, 2015. "The Threat of Corruption and the Optimal Supervisory Task," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-37, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Celik, Gorkem, 2009.
"Mechanism design with collusive supervision,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
- Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
- Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.
- Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel & Andrea R. Hugill, 2016. "Monitoring global supply chains," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9), pages 1878-1897, September.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015.
"Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2013. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4497, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Troy J Scott, 2011. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," Working Papers UWEC-2011-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Benjamin Florian Siggelkow & Jan Trockel & Oliver Dieterle, 2018. "An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle-blowing," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(7), pages 883-914, September.
- Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
- Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2010. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-004, Harvard Business School, revised Feb 2012.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet, 2010.
"The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors,"
Working Papers
2010.144, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1008-1019, December.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2009. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566863, HAL.
- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," Institutions and Markets Papers 98454, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- David Martimort & Yolande Hiriart & Jérôme Pouyet, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Post-Print halshs-00754410, HAL.
- Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2009. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Working Papers halshs-00566863, HAL.
- David Martimort & Yolande Hiriart & Jérôme Pouyet, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754410, HAL.
- Victor Manuel Bennett & Lamar Pierce & Jason A. Snyder & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "Customer-Driven Misconduct: How Competition Corrupts Business Practices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(8), pages 1725-1742, August.
- Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Terms and Term Limits in the Public Sector: Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Dam, Kaniṣka & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2021. "Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: The role of collusive threats," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Mark Schelker, 2008. "Public Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-04, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Aaron Finkle, 2010. "Contracts in the Shadow of the Law: Optimal Litigation Strategies within Organizations," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 9(2), pages 131-155, August.
- Günter Strobl, 2013. "Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 449-473, May.
- Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 1558-1584, October.
- Mark Schelker, 2016. "Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
- Shirley J. , HO, 2007. "R&D Outsourcing Contract with Information Leakage," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.
- Victor Manuel Bennett & Lamar Pierce & Jason A. Snyder & Michael W. Toffel, 2012. "Competition and Illicit Quality," Harvard Business School Working Papers 12-071, Harvard Business School, revised May 2012.
- Fiocco, Raffaele & Gilli, Mario, 2014.
"Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
466, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Raffaele Fiocco & Mario Gilli, 2016. "Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 117(2), pages 93-116, March.
- André de Palma & Luc Leruth & Adnan Mazarei, 2010. "Regulating sovereign wealth funds operating overseas through an external fund manager," Working Papers hal-00488662, HAL.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010. "Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.
- Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
- Gervan Fearon, 2009. "Economics of public good provision: auditing, outsourcing, and bribery," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3), pages 997-1022, August.
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree & Dongsoo Shin, 2004.
"Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings
269, Econometric Society.
- Kim, Doyoung & Lawarree, Jacques & Shin, Dongsoo, 2004. "Exit option in hierarchical agency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1265-1287, November.
Cited by:
- Celik, Gorkem, 2009.
"Mechanism design with collusive supervision,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
- Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
- Grüner, Hans Peter & Felgenhauer, Mike, 2007. "Safety Nets Within Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 6317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000.
"CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Working Papers 0006, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
Cited by:
- Isabelle Brocas, 2005. "Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 317-346, May.
- Rachael Goodhue & Leo Simon, 2016. "Agricultural contracts, adverse selection, and multiple inputs," Agricultural and Food Economics, Springer;Italian Society of Agricultural Economics (SIDEA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-33, December.
- Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008.
"How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 820-831, September.
- Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrea Ichino & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Diskussionsschriften dp0319, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 987, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gerd Muehlheusser & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
- Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Competing for the Attention of Policymakers," Working Papers 2013-14, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
- Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(2), pages 107-139, August.
- Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu & Chiung-Yun Chang, 2013. "Commitment or no-commitment to monitoring in emission tax systems?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(2), pages 171-188, April.
- Aaron Finkle & Dongsoo Shin, 2020. "Obstructive monitoring," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 873-891, October.
- Lawarree, J.P. & Van Audenrode, M., 1993.
"Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
93-07, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Lawarree, Jacques P. & Van Audenrode, Marc A., 1996. "Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 514-531, November.
- Lawarree, J.P. & Van Audenrode, M., 1993. "Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability," Working Papers 93-07, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
Cited by:
- Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018.
"Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
- Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Isabelle Brocas, 2005. "Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 317-346, May.
- Kim, Doyoung & Lawarree, Jacques & Shin, Dongsoo, 2004.
"Exit option in hierarchical agency,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1265-1287, November.
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree & Dongsoo Shin, 2004. "Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 269, Econometric Society.
- Spiros Bougheas & Saksit Thananittayaudom, 2006. "Financial Predation by the "Weak"," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(3), pages 231-244, December.
- Dang, Viet Anh, 2010. "Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 75-89, February.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000.
"CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Working Papers 0006, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
- Khalil, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993.
"Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
93-01, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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"Contracts and Productive Information Gathering,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
97-16, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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- Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997. "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Working Papers 97-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
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- Ben White & Nick Hanley, 2014. "Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Actions or Both?," Discussion Papers in Environment and Development Economics 2014-08, University of St. Andrews, School of Geography and Sustainable Development.
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"Working from Home and Performance Pay: Individual or Collective Payment Schemes?,"
GLO Discussion Paper Series
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"Different Strokes for Different Folks: Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills,"
NBER Working Papers
25499, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Cremer, J. & Khalil, F & Rochet, J.-C., 1996. "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Papers 976.425, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997. "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 97-15, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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"Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design,"
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"Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 89-107, January.
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"Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy,"
Working Papers
1997.08, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
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- Aaron Finkle, "undated". "Obstructive Monitoring," Working Papers 14-05, Davidson College, Department of Economics.
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"CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Working Papers 0006, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
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"Tax Collection in History,"
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- Hideshi Itoh & Tatsuya Kikutani & Osamu Hayashida, 2008.
"Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups,"
NBER Chapters, in: Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance, pages 207-228,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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"Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments [[Créer des incitations contraires à travers le choix des instruments de régulation]],"
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hal-02689372, HAL.
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- Asseyer, Andreas, 2018. "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 222-252.
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"Vertical Restraints Under Asymmetric Information: On The Role Of Participation Constraints,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 379-401, June.
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- Ben White & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 765-787, April.
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"On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion,"
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Cited by:
- Ganuza, Juan Jose & Gomez, Fernando, 2007. "Should we trust the gatekeepers?: Auditors' and lawyers' liability for clients' misconduct," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 96-109, March.
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"A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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- Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," IEPR Working Papers 05.9, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR).
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- Besfamille, M., 2000.
"Fiscal Federalism, Local Public Works and Corruption,"
Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie
2000/01, UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie.
- Martin Besfamille, 2000. "Fiscal federalism, local public works and corruption," CREPP Working Papers 0001, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
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"The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
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"Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties,"
School of Economics Discussion Papers
0205, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
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"Political Corruption in the Execution of Public Contracts,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
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"Works Councils: An Agency Perspective,"
Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, June.
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- Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2016.
"Corruption and bicameral reforms,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 387-411, August.
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"Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-247, February.
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- Ingela Alger & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2001. "Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 496, Boston College Department of Economics.
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"The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research,"
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"Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment,"
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- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2004. "Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2003-02-FC, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/245733, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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"The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors,"
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- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," Institutions and Markets Papers 98454, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- David Martimort & Yolande Hiriart & Jérôme Pouyet, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Post-Print halshs-00754410, HAL.
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- David Martimort & Yolande Hiriart & Jérôme Pouyet, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754410, HAL.
- Martin Besfamille & Pablo Olmos, 2010. "Inspectors or Google Earth? Optimal fiscal policies under uncertain detection of evaders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Dongsoo Shin, 2007. "Contracts under Wage Compression: A Case of Beneficial Collusion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 143-157, July.
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"Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud,"
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- Paolo Buccirossi & Giovanni Immordino & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017. "Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud," CSEF Working Papers 477, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 02 Sep 2017.
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- Luc Leruth, 2012. "Public-Private Cooperation in Infrastructure Development: A Principal-Agent Story of Contingent Liabilities, Fiscal Risks, and Other (Un)pleasant Surprises," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 223-237, June.
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Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
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Articles
- Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022.
"Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
Cited by:
- Mishra, Ajit & Samuel, Andrew, 2024. "Bribery and temptation: More red tape or more discretion?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 641-655.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021.
"Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 179-206, March.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021. "Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 8863, CESifo.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques & Rodivilov, Alexander, 2020.
"Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
See citations under working paper version above.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Alexander Rodivilov, 2018. "Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production," CESifo Working Paper Series 7310, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2019.
"Use it or lose it,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(6), pages 991-1016, December.
Cited by:
- Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 141-157, February.
- Hoyong Jung, 2022. "Online Open Budget: The Effects of Budget Transparency on Budget Efficiency," Public Finance Review, , vol. 50(1), pages 91-119, January.
- Simone Marsiglio & Marco Tolotti, 2020. "Motivation crowding‐out and green‐paradox‐like outcomes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1559-1583, September.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015.
"Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2013. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4497, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Troy J Scott, 2011. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," Working Papers UWEC-2011-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013.
"Contracts offered by bureaucrats,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," Working Papers UWEC-2013-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 4511, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010.
"Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.
Cited by:
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022.
"Frequent audits and honest audits,"
UB School of Economics Working Papers
2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
- Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2021. "Supervisory information and loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Sungho Yun, 2021. "Regulating corruptible certifier behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 109-135, April.
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- Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020.
"A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture,"
Working Papers
2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Marco Alexander Schwarz, 2021. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," CESifo Working Paper Series 8968, CESifo.
- Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2021. "A dynamic theory of regulatory capture," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2021/410, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
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- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015.
"Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2013. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4497, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Troy J Scott, 2011. "Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information," Working Papers UWEC-2011-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
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"Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(3), pages 279-312, October.
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- Gao, Ruoxin & Yao, Shiqing & Yang, Ruina, 2024. "Responsible audit and consumer awareness under collusion risk," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(2), pages 466-476.
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- Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
- Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.
- Andrew Samuel & Amy Farmer & Fabio Mendez, 2020. "Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits, tickets, or both?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(4), pages 420-441, September.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023. "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
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"Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(3), pages 328-344, July.
- Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2020. "Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers," IEG Working Papers 391, Institute of Economic Growth.
- De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
- Kim, Sahrok & Praveen Parboteeah, K. & Cullen, John B. & Jeong, Nara, 2022. "Social institutions approach to women’s firm ownership and firm bribery activity: A study of small-sized firms in emerging markets," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1333-1349.
- Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports," CESifo Working Paper Series 5528, CESifo.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022.
"Frequent audits and honest audits,"
UB School of Economics Working Papers
2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2009.
"On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 281-306, June.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2009. "On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires," Working Papers UWEC-2008-24-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006.
"Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2004. "Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2003-02-FC, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2005-09-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2006. "Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/245733, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Jacques Lawarrée & Dongsoo Shin, 2005.
"Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(4), pages 621-635, December.
Cited by:
- Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
- Dongsoo Shin, 2008. "Collusion and Outcome Equivalency," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 449-459, September.
- Kim, Doyoung & Lawarree, Jacques & Shin, Dongsoo, 2004.
"Exit option in hierarchical agency,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1265-1287, November.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree & Dongsoo Shin, 2004. "Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 269, Econometric Society.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001.
"Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Working Papers 0006, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Lawarree, Jacques P. & Van Audenrode, Marc A., 1996.
"Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 514-531, November.
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- Lawarree, J.P. & Van Audenrode, M., 1993. "Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-07, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Lawarree, J.P. & Van Audenrode, M., 1993. "Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability," Working Papers 93-07, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996.
"On the optimality of allowing collusion,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Working Papers 93-02, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-02, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996.
"A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 117-136, January.
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- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1991. "A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-15, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1991. "A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence," Working Papers 91-15, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 1995.
"Collusive Auditors,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 442-446, May.
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- Lehmann, Markus A., 2002. "Error minimization and deterrence in agency control," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 373-391, May.
- Ingela Alger, 2006. "Optimal Debt Contracts when Credit Managers are (Perhaps) Corruptible," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 648, Boston College Department of Economics.
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"Political Corruption in the Execution of Public Contracts,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
1607, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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- Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 116-140.
- Barr, Abigail & Lindelow, Magnus & Serneels, Pieter, 2009.
"Corruption in public service delivery: An experimental analysis,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 225-239, October.
- Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2009. "Corruption in Public Service delivery: an experimental Analysis," Post-Print hal-00722864, HAL.
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- Thierry Pénard & Saïd Souam, 2002.
"Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique,"
Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 66, pages 209-233.
- Thierry Pénard & S. Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Post-Print halshs-00069687, HAL.
- Thierry Penard & Saïd Souam, 1999. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Working Papers 99-26, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Raffaele Fiocco & Mario Gilli, 2011.
"Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model,"
Working Papers
207, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2011.
- Raffaele Fiocco & Mario Gilli, 2012. "Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Fiocco, Raffaele & Gilli, Mario, 2011. "Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2011-047, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
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"E-Commerce, Two-Sided Markets and Info-Mediation,"
IDEI Working Papers
380, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Alexandre Gaudeul & Bruno Jullien, 2005. "E-commerce, two-sided markets and info-mediation," Industrial Organization 0503014, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Apr 2005.
- Guy David & Philip A. Saynisch & Aaron Smith-McLallen, 2016. "The Inner Workings of the Patient Centered Medical Home Model," NBER Working Papers 22429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barr, Abigail & Lindelow, Magnus & Serneels, Pieter, 2004.
"To serve the community or oneself - the public servant's dilemma,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
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- Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2003. "To serve the community or oneself: the public servant's dilemma," CSAE Working Paper Series 2003-11, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2004. "To Serve The Community Or Oneself: The Public Servant'S Dilemma," Development and Comp Systems 0409035, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
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"Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
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- Roland Strausz, "undated". "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Papers 018, Departmental Working Papers.
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- Pan, Yanchun & Yang, Wen & Ma, Nan & Chen, Zhimin & Zhou, Ming & Xiong, Yi, 2019. "Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 418-428.
- Osipian, Ararat, 2008. "The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata," MPRA Paper 7592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Phalippou, Ludovic & Rauch, Christian & Umber, Marc, 2018. "Private equity portfolio company fees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 559-585.
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- Ararat L. Osipian, 2013. "Corrupt organizations: modeling educators’ misconduct with cellular automata," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
- David, Guy & Saynisch, Philip A. & Smith-McLallen, Aaron, 2018. "The economics of patient-centered care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 60-77.
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"Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 139-157, June.
See citations under working paper version above.
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- Khalil, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?," Working Papers 93-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
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See citations under working paper version above.
- Lawarree, J. & Van Audenrode, M.A., 1992. "Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 92-09, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Lawarree, J. & Van Audenrode, M.A., 1992. "Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability," Working Papers 92-09, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Bemard THlRY & Jacques LAWARREE, 1987.
"Productivite, Cout Et Caracteristiques Technologiques Des Societes Belges De Transports Urbains,"
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 369-396, October.
Cited by:
- Guerino Ardizzi, 2004.
"Cost Efficiency in the Retail Payment Networks: First Evidence from the Italian Credit Card System,"
Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(5), pages 51-82, September.
- Guerino Ardizzi, 2003. "Cost efficiency in the retail payment networks: first evidence from the Italian credit card system," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 480, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Guerino Ardizzi, 2004.
"Cost Efficiency in the Retail Payment Networks: First Evidence from the Italian Credit Card System,"
Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(5), pages 51-82, September.
- Jacques Lawarree, 1986.
"Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public: le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique,"
Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 109, pages 3-31.
Cited by:
- Núria Bosch & Francisco Pedraja & Javier Suárez-Pandiello, 2001. "The efficiency of refuse collection services in Spanish municipalities: do non-controllable variables matter?," Working Papers 2001/4, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Rogge, Nicky & De Jaeger, Simon, 2013. "Measuring and explaining the cost efficiency of municipal solid waste collection and processing services," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 653-664.
- De Jaeger, Simon & Rogge, Nicky, 2014. "Cost-efficiency in packaging waste management: The case of Belgium," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 106-115.
- Teresa Curristine & Zsuzsanna Lonti & Isabelle Joumard, 2007. "Improving Public Sector Efficiency: Challenges and Opportunities," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 1-41.