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Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships

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  • Anke S. Kessler

Abstract

This paper studies a principal-agent model with third-party auditing. Auditing technologies are distinguished according to the quantity (frequency) and the quality (accuracy) of the information they deliver. We show that the frequency of audits is irrelevant if the auditor either is honest or colludes with the agent but auditing evidence can only be concealed and not forged. Only if auditing evidence can be falsified does the principal benefit both from the frequency and from the accuracy of the auditor's observations. The findings therefore indicate that firms should opt for accurate rather than frequent audits under a wide range of circumstances.

Suggested Citation

  • Anke S. Kessler, 2004. "Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(2), pages 210-231, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200406)160:2_210:oaihr_2.0.tx_2-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Aaron Finkle, 2010. "Contracts in the Shadow of the Law: Optimal Litigation Strategies within Organizations," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 9(2), pages 131-155, August.
    3. Ricard Gil & Jordi Mondria, 2011. "Introducing managerial attention allocation in incentive contracts," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 335-358, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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