Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies
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- Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "Performance measurement in multi-task agencies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 148-163, September.
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Cited by:
- Friederike Wall, 2024. "Incomplete incentive contracts in complex task environments: an agent-based simulation with minimal intelligence agents," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 19(3), pages 523-552, July.
- Veikko Thiele, 2009. "Aggregating Performance Measures in Multi-Task Agencies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2693-2699.
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More about this item
Keywords
Multi-task agencies; performance measurement; distortion; congruity; limited liability; incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2007-04-09 (Business Economics)
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