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Loyalty and competence in public agencies

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  • Alexander Wagner

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Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Wagner, 2011. "Loyalty and competence in public agencies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 145-162, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:145-162
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9587-8
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    7. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-656, May.
    8. Guido Friebel & Michael Raith, 2004. "Abuse of Authority and Hierarchical Communication," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 224-244, Summer.
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    10. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, October.
    11. Prendergast, Canice & Topel, Robert H, 1996. "Favoritism in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 958-978, October.
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    13. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
    14. VafaI, Kouroche, 2005. "Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 385-405, June.
    15. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    16. Dittmann, Ingolf, 1999. "How reliable should auditors be?: optimal monitoring in principal-agent relationships," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 523-546, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00768904, HAL.
    2. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Post-Print halshs-00768904, HAL.
    3. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12086, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. Ying Bai & Titi Zhou, 2019. "“Mao’s last revolution”: a dictator’s loyalty–competence tradeoff," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 469-500, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public agencies; Political economy; Loyalty; H1; M5; P1;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • P1 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies

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