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Input Control and Common Risk: Addressing Agent Heterogenity and Risk Aversion in the Presence of Moral Hazard

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  • Goodhue, Rachael E.

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  • Goodhue, Rachael E., 1998. "Input Control and Common Risk: Addressing Agent Heterogenity and Risk Aversion in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Working Papers 225885, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ucdavw:225885
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.225885
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    3. Khalil Fahad & Lawarree Jacques, 1995. "Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 139-157, June.
    4. Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Value Differentiation," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 1-21, December.
    5. Knoeber, Charles R, 1989. "A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 271-292, Fall.
    6. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
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