Overcoming collusion : using a supervisor to costlessly resolve moral hazard
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996.
"On the optimality of allowing collusion,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Working Papers 93-02, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-02, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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- Hauser, John R. & Simester, Duncan I. & Wernerfelt, Birger., 1995. "Internal customers and internal suppliers," Working papers 3759-95. WP (Internationa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
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HD28 .M414 no.3755-95;JEL classification:
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