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Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions

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  • Murali Agastya
  • Oleksii Birulin

Abstract

A Principal owns a project consisting of several tasks. Tasks differ, both in their innate success probabilities and their incremental benefits. Moreover, only specialists can perform these tasks. Subject to moral hazard and adverse selection, in what order should the Principal commission the tasks, and when should she terminate the project? What investments into changing tasks' characteristics yield the highest marginal profit? These are typical issues that arise in sequencing R&D activities and other sequential production processes. We show that, despite informational constraints, a simple index—a task's effective marginal contribution—determines the optimal schedule/mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Murali Agastya & Oleksii Birulin, 2023. "Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 660-698, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:2:p:660-98
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210126
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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