IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cra/wpaper/2008-04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Public Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Schelker

Abstract

Public auditors should reduce agency problems and improve transparency. We address the question of whether auditors should be elected by the citizens or appointed by either the legislature or the executive, and explore the influence of conducting performance audits. We construct a unique dataset at the US State level capturing differences in the institutional design of state auditing institutions. We estimate the influence of auditor characteristics on different outcome variables reflecting government performance and implement an alternative identification strategy relying on citizens? electoral decisions. We examine whether citizens use divided government ? a costly mechanism to control the government ? as a substitute, when other effective, but less costly mechanisms are not available. Even if the empirical results are sometimes difficult to interpret, we generally find that (1) performance audits tend to be beneficial and (2) elected auditors with a strong mandate to conduct performance audits seem to outperform other institutional arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Schelker, 2008. "Public Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-04, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  • Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2008-04.pdf
    File Function: Full Text
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.crema-research.ch/abstracts/2008-04.htm
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006. "Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
    2. Hanssen, F Andrew, 1999. "The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of State Judges," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 205-232, January.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    4. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    5. Hanssen, F Andrew, 2000. "Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Analysis of the States," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 534-571, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ibrahim Mert, 2021. "Qualitative Parameters of Internal Auditing Works on the Preferences of Investment Funds’ Analysts," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 60-71, March.
    2. Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 215-229, June.
    3. Iulian Bogdan Dobra & Attila Szora Tamas, 2009. "The Public Internal Audit Committee In The Social Health Insurance Sector- A Necessity In Romania," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(11), pages 1-54.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guerriero, Carmine, 2006. "Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 12204, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
    3. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    4. Marcin, Isabel & Robalo, Pedro & Tausch, Franziska, 2019. "Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 243-264.
    5. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    6. Timothy Besley, 2013. "Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter?," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 15(1), pages 212-251.
    7. SIDDHARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY & BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2015. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 219-256, April.
    8. Tim Besley & Abigail Payne, 2003. "Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges," IFS Working Papers W03/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    9. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan McCannon, 2014. "The effect of the election of prosecutors on criminal trials," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 141-156, October.
    10. Guerriero, Carmine, 2011. "Accountability in government and regulatory policies: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 453-469.
    11. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2014. "Queuing Up For Justice: Elections and Case Backlogs," Discussion Papers 14-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    12. Bryan C. McCannon, 2013. "Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 696-714, December.
    13. Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, 2004. "Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 209-235, March.
    14. Ian Peacock & Emily Ryo, 2022. "A study of pandemic and stigma effects in removal proceedings," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 560-593, September.
    15. Cho, Seo-young & Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya, 2010. "Compliance for big brothers: An empirical analysis on the impact of the anti-trafficking protocol," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 118, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    16. Li, Chen, 2015. "Do immigrants attract FDI? District-level evidence from Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113130, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    17. Abel Brodeur, 2012. "Smoking, Income and Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Smoking Bans," Working Papers halshs-00664269, HAL.
    18. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Ooi, Evarn & Slonim, Robert, 2017. "Racial discrimination and white first name adoption: a field experiment in the Australian labour market," Working Papers 2017-15, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    19. Shun-Yang Lee & Julian Runge & Daniel Yoo & Yakov Bart & Anett Gyurak & J. W. Schneider, 2023. "COVID-19 Demand Shocks Revisited: Did Advertising Technology Help Mitigate Adverse Consequences for Small and Midsize Businesses?," Papers 2307.09035, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    20. Cowling, Marc & Ughetto, Elisa & Lee, Neil, 2018. "The innovation debt penalty: Cost of debt, loan default, and the effects of a public loan guarantee on high-tech firms," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 166-176.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public auditors; audit courts; political institutions; political economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anna-Lea Werlen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cremach.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.