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Preventing abuse of authority in hierarchies

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  • Vafai, Kouroche

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  • Vafai, Kouroche, 2002. "Preventing abuse of authority in hierarchies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1143-1166, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:20:y:2002:i:8:p:1143-1166
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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
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    6. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    7. Olsen, Trond E & Torsvik, Gaute, 1998. "Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 413-438, May.
    8. Ronald Bosman & Matthias Sutter & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Emotional Hazard and Real Effort in a Power-to-Take Game," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-106/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
    10. Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "Incomplete Contracts and Signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 432-443, Autumn.
    11. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
    12. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    13. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
    14. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-656, May.
    15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1990. "Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 301-324, Fall.
    16. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    17. repec:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:4:p:485-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    19. Robert H. Frank, 1993. "The Strategic Role of the Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(2), pages 160-184, April.
    20. Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1995. "Threats Without Binding Commitment," Discussion Papers 1139, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    21. Kessler, Anke S., 2000. "On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 280-291, April.
    22. Jean‐Jacques Laffont & Jean‐Charles Rochet, 1997. "Collusion in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 485-495, December.
    23. Henry Mintzberg, 1985. "The Organization As Political Arena," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 133-154, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00768904, HAL.
    2. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Post-Print halshs-00768904, HAL.
    3. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1008-1019, December.
    4. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12086, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Oechssler, Jörg & Shah, Anwar, 2014. "Hierarchy, coercion, and exploitation: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 155-168.
    6. Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.
    7. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Supervision in Firms," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12084, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    8. VafaI, Kouroche, 2005. "Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 385-405, June.
    9. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Supervision in Firms," Post-Print halshs-00768900, HAL.
    10. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Supervision in Firms," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00768900, HAL.

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