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Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations

Author

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  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Vassili Vergopoulos

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We study within one theoretical framework two related phenomena – ingratiation by subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards their employees. We express ingratiation by opinion conformity of the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager. Favoritism of the manager is inferred from a bias when reporting toa firm her observation of the worker's performance. We show interdependences of favoritism and ingratiation by investigating their influence on wages and profit. We study the more sophisticated manager and firm that try to infer the worker's opinion and the manager's observation. Such higher degrees of sophistication can mitigate the consequences of ingratiation and favoritism.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-02523864, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-02523864
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0032
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    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools

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