IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v18y1998i4p365-384.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Independent auditors as fiscal gatekeepers1

Author

Listed:
  • Franzoni, Luigi Alberto

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 1998. "Independent auditors as fiscal gatekeepers1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 365-384, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:4:p:365-384
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144-8188(98)00023-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baiman, S & Evans, Jh & Nagarajan, Nj, 1991. "Collusion In Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 1-18.
    2. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June.
    4. Baiman, S & Evans, Jh & Noel, J, 1987. "Optimal-Contracts With A Utility-Maximizing Auditor," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 217-244.
    5. Roland Strausz, 1997. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 337-357.
    6. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1991. "Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 163-181, Spring.
    7. Antle, R, 1982. "The Auditor As An Economic Agent," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 503-527.
    8. Dye, Ronald A, 1993. "Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 887-914, October.
    9. Gjesdal, F, 1981. "Accounting For Stewardship," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 208-231.
    10. Melumad, Nd & Thoman, L, 1990. "On Auditors And The Courts In An Adverse Selection Setting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 77-120.
    11. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-656, May.
    12. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee, 1989. "Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 139-163, Summer.
    13. Klepper, Steven & Mazur, Mark & Nagin, Daniel, 1991. "Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 205-229, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Athanasios Lapatinas & Anastasia Litina & Eftichios Sophocles Sartzetakis, 2019. "Environmental projects in the presence of corruption," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(1), pages 103-144, February.
    2. Athanasios Lapatinas & Anastasia Litina & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2011. "Corruption and Environmental Policy: An Alternative Perspective," Working Papers 2011.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Athanasios Lapatinas & Anastasia Litina & Eftichios Sophocles Sartzetakis, 2014. "Is Abatement Effective in the Presence of Corruption? A Theoretical Exploration," DEM Discussion Paper Series 14-29, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    4. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dennis H. Caplan & Michael Kirschenheiter, 2000. "Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 387-428, September.
    2. Hindriks, Jean, 1999. "On the incompatibility between revenue maximisation and tax progressivity1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 123-140, March.
    3. John, Kose & John, Teresa A., 2006. "Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 71-94, April.
    4. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
    5. Dittmann, Ingolf, 1999. "How reliable should auditors be?: optimal monitoring in principal-agent relationships," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 523-546, September.
    6. Carlos Corona & Ramandeep S. Randhawa, 2010. "The Auditor's Slippery Slope: An Analysis of Reputational Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(6), pages 924-937, June.
    7. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
    8. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
    9. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2009. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring: Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 58-70, January.
    10. Nahum Melumad & Lynda Thoman, 1990. "An equilibrium analysis of optimal audit contracts," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 22-55, September.
    11. Choe, Chongwoo, 1998. "Contract design and costly verification games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 327-340, February.
    12. Villadsen, Bente, 1995. "Communication and delegation in collusive agencies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 315-344, April.
    13. Persons, John C., 1997. "Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 269-306, October.
    14. Mingcherng Deng & Nahum Melumad & Toshi Shibano, 2012. "Auditors’ Liability, Investments, and Capital Markets: A Potential Unintended Consequence of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(5), pages 1179-1215, December.
    15. Lerong He & Rong Yang & Yuanlong He, 2018. "Does social exchange relationship impair audit committee effectiveness?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 219-249, June.
    16. Ralf Ewert & Alfred Wagenhofer, 2019. "Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality and Audit Quality," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 121-168, March.
    17. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
    18. Nahum D. Melumad & Mark A. Wolfson & Amir Ziv, 1994. "Should Taxpayers Be Subsidized to Hire Third†Party Preparers? A Game†Theoretic Analysis," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 553-594, June.
    19. Daron Acemoglu & Miles Gietzmann, 1998. "Auditor independence, incomplete contracts and the role of legal liability," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(3), pages 355-375.
    20. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:4:p:365-384. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.