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Introducing managerial attention allocation in incentive contracts

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  • Ricard Gil
  • Jordi Mondria

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  • Ricard Gil & Jordi Mondria, 2011. "Introducing managerial attention allocation in incentive contracts," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 335-358, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:3:p:335-358
    DOI: 10.1007/s13209-011-0059-2
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    32. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
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    36. Anke S. Kessler, 2004. "Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(2), pages 210-231, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2022. "The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking," OSIPP Discussion Paper 22E005, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    2. Marina Halac & Andrea Prat, 2016. "Managerial Attention and Worker Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3104-3132, October.
    3. Prat, Andrea & Halac, Marina, 2014. "Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement," CEPR Discussion Papers 10035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive contracts; Attention allocation; Rational inattention; Monitoring; D86; L14;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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