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Content
2020, Volume 123, Issue C
- 1-21 Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions
by Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan
- 22-40 Theories and cases in decisions under uncertainty
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Minardi, Stefania & Samuelson, Larry
- 41-53 Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
by Schlegel, Jan Christoph
- 54-67 Bayesian games with intentions
by Bjorndahl, Adam & Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael
- 68-80 Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
by Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Newton, Jonathan
- 81-100 Social learning with coordination motives
by Song, Yangbo & Zhang, Jiahua
- 101-119 Corrupt police
by Abbink, Klaus & Ryvkin, Dmitry & Serra, Danila
- 120-126 Rationalizable choice functions
by Yang, Yi-You
- 127-170 Feedback spillovers across tasks, self-confidence and competitiveness
by Banerjee, Ritwik & Gupta, Nabanita Datta & Villeval, Marie Claire
- 171-181 Group identification: An integrated approach
by Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi
- 182-206 Fictitious play in networks
by Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena
- 210-227 Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
by DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura K.
- 228-239 Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game
by Tajika, Tomoya
- 240-271 Reputation and news suppression in the media industry
by Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A.
- 272-287 Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion
by Li, Chen & Turmunkh, Uyanga & Wakker, Peter P.
- 288-294 Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential
by Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori
- 295-326 Tatonnement beyond gross substitutes? Gradient descent to the rescue
by Cheung, Yun Kuen & Cole, Richard & Devanur, Nikhil R.
- 327-341 Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
by Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan
- 342-358 Clinching auctions with online supply
by Goel, Gagan & Mirrokni, Vahab & Paes Leme, Renato
- 359-376 The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant
by Bilò, Vittorio & Flammini, Michele & Moscardelli, Luca
2020, Volume 122, Issue C
- 1-27 Distributions of centrality on networks
by Dasaratha, Krishna
- 28-54 Stability in matching markets with peer effects
by Bykhovskaya, Anna
- 55-82 Competition with an information clearinghouse and asymmetric firms: Why more than two firms compete (or not) for shoppers
by Arnold, Michael & Zhang, Lan
- 83-104 Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side
by Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon
- 105-129 Fishing for fools
by Malmendier, Ulrike & Szeidl, Adam
- 130-149 Preordered service in contract enforcement
by Auerbach, Jan U. & Fonseca, Miguel A.
- 150-167 Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment
by Aina, Chiara & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Gamba, Astrid
- 168-202 Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
by Arigapudi, Srinivas
- 203-232 Dynamic price discovery: Transparency vs. information design
by Kakhbod, Ali & Song, Fei
- 233-239 The evolution of monetary equilibrium
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 240-255 A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
by Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto
- 256-276 Correlated beliefs: Predicting outcomes in 2 × 2 games
by Cason, Timothy N. & Sharma, Tridib & Vadovič, Radovan
- 277-289 Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone
by Talamàs, Eduard & Vohra, Rakesh
- 290-317 Consulting collusive experts
by Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi
- 318-327 Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Julien, Ludovic
- 328-340 In-group bias in prisons
by Guo, Shiqi & Liang, Pinghan & Xiao, Erte
- 341-353 On self-serving strategic beliefs
by Ging-Jehli, Nadja R. & Schneider, Florian H. & Weber, Roberto A.
- 354-369 Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study
by Bayona, Anna & Brandts, Jordi & Vives, Xavier
- 370-390 Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc
- 391-406 Habits as adaptations: An experimental study
by Matysková, Ludmila & Rogers, Brian & Steiner, Jakub & Sun, Keh-Kuan
- 407-412 A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem
by Dizdar, Deniz & Kováč, Eugen
- 413-425 Determinants of trust: The role of personal experiences
by Schwerter, Frederik & Zimmermann, Florian
- 426-439 Lexicographic probabilities and robustness
by Petri, Henrik
- 440-452 Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach
by Lehrer, Ehud & Teper, Roee
- 453-475 Information acquisition and welfare in network games
by Leister, C. Matthew
2020, Volume 121, Issue C
- 1-31 Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: An experimental study
by Brütt, Katharina & Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep
- 32-54 Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
by Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne
- 55-75 Equal sacrifice taxation
by Stovall, John E.
- 76-89 Pre-matching gambles
by Zhang, Hanzhe
- 90-107 Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating
by Michaeli, Moti
- 108-116 Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
by Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele
- 117-145 On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining
by Navarro, Noemí & Veszteg, Róbert F.
- 146-168 A theory of decisive leadership
by Bernheim, B. Douglas & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
- 169-189 Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
by Fukuda, Satoshi
- 190-203 Communication via intermediaries
by Kwiek, Maksymilian
- 204-231 Matching through institutions
by Bloch, Francis & Cantala, David & Gibaja, Damián
- 232-251 Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice
by Fiedler, Susann & Hillenbrand, Adrian
- 252-264 Unraveling over time
by Ambuehl, Sandro & Groves, Vivienne
- 265-296 Starting small to communicate
by Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif
- 297-306 Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions
by Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle
- 307-328 Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
by Zhang, Qiaoxi
- 329-367 Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment
by Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 368-381 Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation
by Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
- 382-412 Money burning in the theory of delegation
by Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle
- 413-434 Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets
by Knudson, Mathew
- 435-452 The agency costs of on-the-job search
by Herbold, Daniel & Schumacher, Heiner
- 453-481 Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse
by Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N.
- 482-505 Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
by Devanur, Nikhil R. & Haghpanah, Nima & Psomas, Alexandros
- 506-530 Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions
by Wittwer, Milena
- 533-547 Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio
- 548-564 Affective empathy in non-cooperative games
by Vásquez, Jorge & Weretka, Marek
- 565-584 Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
by Liu, Peng
2020, Volume 120, Issue C
- 1-15 A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
by Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M.
- 16-27 Identifiable information structures
by Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 28-57 Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Sanna, Federico
- 58-66 On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)
by Doni, Nicola & Menicucci, Domenico
- 67-85 Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment
by Negrelli, Sara
- 86-95 A sandwich theorem for generic n × n two person games
by Sun, Ching-jen
- 96-120 Payoff information and learning in signaling games
by Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin
- 121-131 Innovation adoption and collective experimentation
by Sadler, Evan
- 132-143 The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
- 144-153 Assortative multisided assignment games: The extreme core points
by Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier & Rafels, Carlos & Ybern, Neus
- 154-179 Weak belief and permissibility
by Catonini, Emiliano & De Vito, Nicodemo
- 180-192 A market design approach to job rotation
by Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun
- 193-208 Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments
by Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa
- 209-224 On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
by Catonini, Emiliano
- 225-245 Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games
by Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
- 246-256 What you don't know can help you in school assignment
by Dur, Umut Mert & Morrill, Thayer
- 257-288 An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
by Guarino, Pierfrancesco
- 289-310 Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal
by Hill, Brian
- 311-324 Bribing the Self
by Gneezy, Uri & Saccardo, Silvia & Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Veldhuizen, Roel
- 325-335 Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
by Chaturvedi, Rakesh
- 336-344 On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
by Alston, Max
- 345-369 Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing
by Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
- 370-390 Essentially stable matchings
by Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew
- 391-433 Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
by García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír
- 434-457 Self-rejecting mechanisms
by Correia-da-Silva, João
2020, Volume 119, Issue C
- 1-14 Myopic perception in repeated games
by Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan
- 15-29 The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
by Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram
- 30-55 Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model
by Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes
- 56-78 Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
by Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi
- 79-97 Agency, potential and contagion
by Newton, Jonathan & Sercombe, Damian
- 98-104 Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections
by Bernhardt, Dan & Ghosh, Meenakshi
- 110-122 On the roots of the intrinsic value of decision rights: Experimental evidence
by Ferreira, João V. & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Tarroux, Benoît
- 123-147 The attraction effect and its explanations
by Castillo, Geoffrey
- 148-171 Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison
by Balafoutas, Loukas & García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Jaber-Lopez, Tarek & Mitrokostas, Evangelos
- 172-188 Entry-deterring agency
by Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras
- 189-196 Dominance rationality: A unified approach
by Hillas, John & Samet, Dov
- 197-215 Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
by Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio
- 216-233 Compromise and coordination: An experimental study
by He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin
- 234-250 Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
by Margaria, Chiara
- 251-266 When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
by Zhang, Jun
- 267-287 The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
by Noussair, Charles N. & Seres, Gyula
- 288-308 Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
by Sun, Xiang & Zeng, Yishu
- 309-338 Rational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator game experiments
by Grech, Philip D. & Nax, Heinrich H.
- 339-357 Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment
by Bisin, Alberto & Hyndman, Kyle
- 358-382 Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations
by Li, Jin & Powell, Michael
- 383-391 Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
by Solan, Eilon & Solan, Omri N. & Solan, Ron
2019, Volume 118, Issue C
- 1-6 On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria
by Balkenborg, Dieter & Vermeulen, Dries
- 7-28 Tick size, price grids and market performance: Stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium
by Plott, Charles & Roll, Richard & Seo, Han & Zhao, Hao
- 29-46 Group targeting under networked synergies
by Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric
- 47-59 Endogenous price leadership with an essential input
by Madden, Paul & Pezzino, Mario
- 60-71 Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach
by Alon, Shiri & Lehrer, Ehud
- 72-93 Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
by Hoffmann, Eric J. & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 94-109 On comparison of experts
by Kavaler, Itay & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 110-125 Rationalizable strategies in random games
by Pei, Ting & Takahashi, Satoru
- 126-140 Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: A tale of two rules
by Athanasoglou, Stergios
- 141-160 Farsighted stability in patent licensing: An abstract game approach
by Hirai, Toshiyuki & Watanabe, Naoki & Muto, Shigeo
- 161-175 Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
by Kim, Duk Gyoo
- 176-192 The endgame
by Banerjee, Anurag N. & Markovich, Sarit & Seccia, Giulio
- 193-218 Lying and reciprocity
by Dato, Simon & Feess, Eberhard & Nieken, Petra
- 219-240 Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation
by Tabasso, Nicole
- 241-268 The swing voter's curse in social networks
by Buechel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia
- 269-283 Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists
by Bergstrom, Ted & Garratt, Rodney & Leo, Greg
- 284-294 Should straw polls be banned?
by Ali, S. Nageeb & Bohren, J. Aislinn
- 295-315 Information choice in a social learning experiment
by Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed & Kornienko, Tatiana & Ma, Mingye
- 316-341 Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: The impact of higher-order history
by Gong, Binglin & Yang, Chun-Lei
- 342-353 Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
by De, Parikshit & Mitra, Manipushpak
- 354-365 Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture
by Newton, Jonathan & Wait, Andrew & Angus, Simon D.
- 366-373 Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago
by Doğan, Battal & Yenmez, M. Bumin
- 374-381 Obvious belief elicitation
by Tsakas, Elias
- 382-411 Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”
by Barbieri, Stefano & Kovenock, Dan & Malueg, David A. & Topolyan, Iryna
- 412-433 Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
by Gui, Zhengqing & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig & Zhao, Xiaojian
- 434-462 An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
by Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Sandholm, William H.
- 463-485 A model of pre-electoral coalition formation
by Shin, Euncheol
- 486-490 A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
by Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh
- 494-510 Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
by Alaei, Saeed & Hartline, Jason & Niazadeh, Rad & Pountourakis, Emmanouil & Yuan, Yang
- 511-532 Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
by Azar, Pablo D. & Kleinberg, Robert & Weinberg, S. Matthew
- 533-569 Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions
by Bhaskar, Umang & Ligett, Katrina & Schulman, Leonard J. & Swamy, Chaitanya
- 570-588 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales
by Devanur, Nikhil R. & Peres, Yuval & Sivan, Balasubramanian
- 589-608 Economic efficiency requires interaction
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Nisan, Noam & Oren, Sigal
- 609-625 On the hardness of designing public signals
by Dughmi, Shaddin
- 626-647 A stable marriage requires communication
by Gonczarowski, Yannai A. & Nisan, Noam & Ostrovsky, Rafail & Rosenbaum, Will
- 648-667 Welfare maximization with production costs: A primal dual approach
by Huang, Zhiyi & Kim, Anthony
2019, Volume 117, Issue C
- 1-14 Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem
by Bahel, Eric & Trudeau, Christian
- 15-39 Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin & Smith, Alec
- 40-58 Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents
by Tesoriere, Antonio
- 59-81 Self-selection in school choice
by Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan
- 82-97 Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
by Bernergård, Axel & Mohlin, Erik
- 98-119 Pre-trade private investments
by Dilmé, Francesc
- 120-143 Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility
by Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu
- 144-162 The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
by Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan
- 163-194 Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
by Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud
- 195-217 Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance
by Munro, David R. & Rassenti, Stephen J.
- 218-237 Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment
by Choi, Syngjoo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Kim, Jinwoo
- 238-249 Zero-sum games with ambiguity
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Vieille, Nicolas
- 250-275 Motivated memory in dictator games
by Saucet, Charlotte & Villeval, Marie Claire
- 276-288 Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
by Ichihashi, Shota
- 289-315 An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities
by Corazzini, Luca & Galavotti, Stefano & Valbonesi, Paola
- 316-321 An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept
by Voorneveld, Mark
- 322-341 Proper scoring rules with general preferences: A dual characterization of optimal reports
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Healy, Paul J. & Lambert, Nicolas S.
- 342-360 Understanding outcome bias
by Brownback, Andy & Kuhn, Michael A.
- 361-379 Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator
by Hanato, Shunsuke
- 380-387 Hedging, ambiguity, and the reversal of order axiom
by Oechssler, Jörg & Rau, Hannes & Roomets, Alex
- 388-401 Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes
- 402-419 The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games
by Klumpp, Tilman & Konrad, Kai A. & Solomon, Adam
- 420-432 Teams promise but do not deliver
by Nielsen, Kirby & Bhattacharya, Puja & Kagel, John H. & Sengupta, Arjun
- 433-450 Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis
by Maaser, Nicola & Paetzel, Fabian & Traub, Stefan
- 451-460 Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion
by Gravel, Nicolas & Poitevin, Michel
- 461-478 Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation
by Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei
- 479-498 The truth behind the myth of the Folk theorem
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael & Seeman, Lior
2019, Volume 116, Issue C
- 1-37 On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
by Trost, Michael
- 38-64 A strategic product for belief functions
by Stauber, Ronald
- 65-72 Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
by Peralta, Esteban
- 73-95 Decisions under uncertainty in social contexts
by Müller, Stephan & Rau, Holger A.
- 96-104 Exploration and correlation
by Piermont, Evan & Teper, Roee
- 105-115 Claim games for estate division problems
by Peters, Hans & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries
- 116-121 Scale effects in multi-unit auctions
by Elskamp, Rebecca & Kirkegaard, René
- 122-127 Strategic voting when participation is costly
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 128-151 Competition for talent when firms' mission matters
by Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia
- 152-157 An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
by Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Gottlieb, Daniel
- 158-178 Rhetoric matters: A social norms explanation for the anomaly of framing
by Chang, Daphne & Chen, Roy & Krupka, Erin
- 179-184 Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
by Nax, Heinrich H. & Newton, Jonathan
- 185-202 Comprehensive rationalizability
by Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 203-216 On the identification of changing tastes
by Mihm, Maximilian & Ozbek, Kemal
- 217-240 The development of consistent decision-making across economic domains
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Combs, T. Dalton & Kodaverdian, Niree
- 241-259 Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
by Mechtenberg, Lydia & Tyran, Jean-Robert
- 260-268 Liability games
by Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P.
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