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Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains

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  • Liu, Peng

Abstract

We present a possibility result on the existence of a random assignment rule satisfying sd-strategy-proofness, sd-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. In particular, we introduce a class of preference domains: sequentially dichotomous domains. On any such domain, the probabilistic serial rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is sd-strategy-proof. Moreover, any sequentially dichotomous domain is maximal for this rule to be sd-strategy-proof.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Peng, 2020. "Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 565-584.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:565-584
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.006
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    2. Peng Liu & Sijia Xu, 2024. "Presenting objects for random allocation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Random assignment; Probabilistic serial rule; Sequentially dichotomous domain; Sd-strategy-proof;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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