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Content
2018, Volume 108, Issue C
- 341-362 Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case
by Cheung, Man-Wah & Lahkar, Ratul
- 363-378 Effectivity and power
by Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans
- 379-390 The conditional Shapley–Shubik measure for ternary voting games
by Friedman, Jane & Parker, Cameron
- 391-400 The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index
by Haimanko, Ori
- 401-410 The query complexity of correlated equilibria
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam
- 411-431 Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games
by Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney
- 432-451 Money as minimal complexity
by Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin
- 452-465 Graphical exchange mechanisms
by Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin
- 466-477 Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
by Cao, Zhigang & Qin, Chengzhong & Yang, Xiaoguang
- 478-485 Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Julien, Ludovic & Tonin, Simone
- 486-503 Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators: Applications to zero-sum stochastic games
by Ziliotto, Bruno
- 504-522 Zero-sum revision games
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan
- 523-540 Acceptable strategy profiles in stochastic games
by Solan, Eilon
- 541-557 On a class of vertices of the core
by Grabisch, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter
- 558-573 Competitive pricing and the core: With reference to matching
by Ostroy, Joseph M.
- 574-584 Fair stable sets of simple games
by Talamàs, Eduard
- 585-591 Coalition preferences with individual prospects
by Baucells, Manel & Samet, Dov
- 592-599 Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley
by Zhao, Jingang
- 600-613 Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information
by Matros, Alexander
2018, Volume 107, Issue C
- 1-20 Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
by Han, Xiang
- 21-40 Reward schemes
by Lagziel, David & Lehrer, Ehud
- 41-59 Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
by Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- 60-92 Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments
by Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph
- 93-108 Collusion through communication in auctions
by Agranov, Marina & Yariv, Leeat
- 109-122 Stable biased sampling
by Häfner, Samuel
- 123-134 Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence
by Fehr, Dietmar
- 135-152 Constitutions and groups
by Mauleon, Ana & Roehl, Nils & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
- 153-181 How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
by Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik
- 182-202 Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task
by Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs
- 203-219 Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
by Zhang, Huanren
- 220-237 Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
by Fainmesser, Itay P. & Goldberg, David A.
- 238-252 Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: An experiment
by Daskalova, Vessela
- 253-281 Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
by Fonseca, Miguel A. & Peters, Kim
- 282-297 Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory
by Gee, Laura K. & Schreck, Michael J.
- 298-315 Buridanic competition
by Bachi, Benjamin & Spiegler, Ran
- 316-328 Inequality and risk-taking behaviour
by Hopkins, Ed
- 329-344 Temptation and commitment in the laboratory
by Houser, Daniel & Schunk, Daniel & Winter, Joachim & Xiao, Erte
- 345-363 On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
by Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit
- 364-379 Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
by Xiao, Jun
- 380-395 Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning
by Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander
2017, Volume 106, Issue C
- 1-15 An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
by Muto, Nozomu & Sato, Shin
- 16-37 Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
by Wright, James R. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin
- 38-50 Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
by Arzumanyan, Mariam & Polborn, Mattias K.
- 51-74 Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
by Gauer, F. & Hellmann, T.
- 75-88 Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games
by Seel, Christian & Tsakas, Elias
- 89-113 Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market
by Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav
- 114-133 Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning
by Marden, Jason R.
- 134-152 Introspective unawareness and observable choice
by Piermont, Evan
- 153-160 Information control in reputational cheap talk
by Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep
- 161-178 Promises and expectations
by Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander
- 179-187 The procedural egalitarian solution
by Dietzenbacher, Bas & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud
- 188-208 Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence
by Cooper, Kristen B. & Schneider, Henry S. & Waldman, Michael
- 209-226 Applying “theory of mind”: Theory and experiments
by Kimbrough, Erik O. & Robalino, Nikolaus & Robson, Arthur J.
- 227-238 Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
by Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin
- 239-259 Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants
by Casella, Alessandra & Laslier, Jean-François & Macé, Antonin
- 260-276 Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
by Wu, Jiabin
- 277-293 Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price
by Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Woods, Daniel
- 294-316 Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey
by Paes Leme, Renato
- 317-328 Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result
by Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland
- 329-342 The cost of segregation in (social) networks
by Allouch, Nizar
2017, Volume 105, Issue C
- 1-8 Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
by Huang, Chao & Tian, Guoqiang
- 9-39 Balanced ranking mechanisms
by Long, Yan & Mishra, Debasis & Sharma, Tridib
- 40-58 Peer effects and local congestion in networks
by Currarini, Sergio & Fumagalli, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio
- 59-83 Modularity and greed in double auctions
by Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim
- 84-103 Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities
by Demange, Gabrielle
- 104-111 Auctions with selective entry
by Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng
- 112-121 Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 122-147 The Inverse Shapley value problem
by De, Anindya & Diakonikolas, Ilias & Servedio, Rocco A.
- 148-154 On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index
by Álvarez-Mozos, M. & Alonso-Meijide, J.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G.
- 155-176 Paternalism, homophily and cultural transmission in random networks
by Panebianco, Fabrizio & Verdier, Thierry
- 177-194 Social motives vs social influence: An experiment on interdependent time preferences
by Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael & Ponti, Giovanni
- 195-211 Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
by Ewerhart, Christian
- 212-229 Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence
by Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry
- 230-254 Contagion exposure and protection technology
by Cerdeiro, Diego A.
- 255-275 Privacy-constrained network formation
by Acemoglu, Daron & Makhdoumi, Ali & Malekian, Azarakhsh & Ozdaglar, Asuman
- 276-296 Communication and visibility in public goods provision
by Haruvy, Ernan & Li, Sherry Xin & McCabe, Kevin & Twieg, Peter
- 297-315 Sequential commitment games
by Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 316-328 Wary of the worst: Maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive
by Harless, Patrick
- 329-348 Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: A social dilemma experiment
by Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter
- 349-367 Peer effects in endogenous networks
by Hiller, Timo
2017, Volume 104, Issue C
- 1-23 Confirmation bias with motivated beliefs
by Charness, Gary & Dave, Chetan
- 24-42 Mixed signals: Charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income
by Bracha, Anat & Vesterlund, Lise
- 43-58 Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
by Klaus, Bettina
- 59-77 Bargaining in dynamic markets
by Manea, Mihai
- 78-91 Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux
by Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O.
- 92-130 Continuous-time stochastic games
by Neyman, Abraham
- 131-145 Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality
by Martin, Daniel
- 146-164 Reasoning about rationality
by Bjorndahl, A. & Halpern, J.Y. & Pass, R.
- 165-176 The curse of the first-in–first-out queue discipline
by Platz, Trine Tornøe & Østerdal, Lars Peter
- 177-189 Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction
by Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard
- 190-221 Common value elections with private information and informative priors: Theory and experiments
by Mengel, Friederike & Rivas, Javier
- 222-229 Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip
- 230-240 Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
by Kumano, Taro
- 241-251 Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
by Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos
- 252-270 Calendar mechanisms
by Hinnosaar, Toomas
- 271-292 Modes of ambiguous communication
by Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T.
- 293-308 Perception games and privacy
by Gradwohl, Ronen & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 309-328 A new epistemic characterization of ε-proper rationalizability
by Perea, Andrés & Roy, Souvik
- 329-349 Optimal dynamic information provision
by Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas
- 350-371 Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach
by Kim, Semin
- 372-391 A tug-of-war team contest
by Häfner, Samuel
- 392-410 Payoff externalities and social learning
by Arieli, Itai
- 411-429 Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
by Gentzkow, Matthew & Kamenica, Emir
- 430-443 Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A ‘state of the art’ model
by Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin
- 444-455 Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests
by Gelder, Alan & Kovenock, Dan
- 456-467 Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
by Ben-Zwi, Oren
- 468-485 Efficient voting with penalties
by Kwiek, Maksymilian
- 486-493 “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests
by Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kim, Sang-Hyun
- 494-506 Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
by Buisseret, Peter
- 507-516 Shills and snipes
by Bose, Subir & Daripa, Arup
- 517-534 Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration
by Newton, Jonathan
- 535-562 Search with multiple attributes: Theory and empirics
by Sanjurjo, Adam
- 563-567 Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
by Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui
- 568-594 Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks
by Leduc, Matt V. & Jackson, Matthew O. & Johari, Ramesh
- 595-612 Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values
by Garrett, Daniel F.
- 613-631 Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
by Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve
- 632-655 Test design under voluntary participation
by Rosar, Frank
- 656-665 Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
by Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz
- 666-673 Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty
by Kuzmics, Christoph
- 674-680 The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games
by Brandl, Florian
- 681-705 Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
by Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Müller, Daniel & Strack, Philipp
- 706-725 The management of innovation: Experimental evidence
by Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W.
- 726-743 “I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games
by Arechar, Antonio A. & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G.
- 744-759 Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
by Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen
- 760-774 Dilemmas, coordination and defection: How uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction
by Maas, Alexander & Goemans, Christopher & Manning, Dale & Kroll, Stephan & Brown, Thomas
2017, Volume 103, Issue C
- 19-29 Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus
- 30-40 Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
by Anesi, Vincent & Duggan, John
- 41-66 On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations
by Bravo, Mario & Mertikopoulos, Panayotis
- 67-82 Bidding rings: A bargaining approach
by Chatterjee, Kalyan & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mukherjee, Conan
- 83-93 Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
by Deckelbaum, Alan & Micali, Silvio
- 94-115 Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
by Ding, Tingting & Schotter, Andrew
- 116-144 Biased contests for symmetric players
by Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry
- 145-167 Flexible contracts
by Gottardi, Piero & Tallon, Jean Marc & Ghirardato, Paolo
- 168-184 Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
by Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian
- 185-198 A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 199-224 Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments
by Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin
- 225-253 Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
by Li, Yunan
- 254-261 Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
- 262-285 Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers
by Selcuk, Cemil
- 286-312 Social groups and social network formation
by Tarbush, Bassel & Teytelboym, Alexander
2017, Volume 102, Issue C
- 1-19 Value Formation: The Role of Esteem
by Akerlof, Robert
- 20-43 An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Choi, Syngjoo & Kim, Jinwoo
- 44-55 The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
by Jiao, Zhenhua & Tian, Guoqiang
- 56-68 Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
by Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao
- 69-97 Loss allocation in energy transmission networks
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & González-Díaz, Julio & González-Rueda, Ángel M. & P. Fernández de Córdoba, María
- 98-110 Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
by Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter
- 111-126 Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
by Duggan, John
- 127-137 Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences
by Dold, Malte & Khadjavi, Menusch
- 138-146 Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
by Kimya, Mert
- 147-161 Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
by Siegenthaler, Simon
- 162-178 Monopoly pricing and diffusion of social network goods
by Shin, Euncheol
- 179-198 Unanimous rules in the laboratory
by Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Malherbe, Frédéric
- 199-223 Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse
by McMurray, Joseph
- 224-232 Propaganda and credulity
by Little, Andrew T.
- 233-239 A note on testing guilt aversion
by Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander & Suetens, Sigrid
- 240-254 Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts
by Schmidbauer, Eric
- 255-268 The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes
by Hong, Fuhai & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Xiaojian
- 269-285 Honesty and informal agreements
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan
- 286-302 An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
by Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Sorensen, Andrea & Walker, James & Williams, Arlington
- 303-315 An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Smith, Angela M.
- 316-338 Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence
by Bhattacharya, Sourav & Duffy, John & Kim, SunTak
- 339-372 Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions
by Wellman, Michael P. & Sodomka, Eric & Greenwald, Amy
- 373-387 Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
by Kirkegaard, René
- 388-408 Committee design with endogenous participation
by Hahn, Volker
- 409-432 Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
by Stauber, Ronald
- 433-444 Incentives and cheating
by Kajackaite, Agne & Gneezy, Uri
- 445-454 A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback
by Gneezy, Uri & Gravert, Christina & Saccardo, Silvia & Tausch, Franziska
- 455-461 Inferring beliefs from actions
by Arieli, Itai & Mueller-Frank, Manuel
- 462-476 Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
by Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu
- 477-486 A note on pre-play communication
by Sobel, Joel
- 487-507 At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
by Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong
- 508-524 Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
by Nicolò, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo
- 525-547 Taking turns
by Leo, Greg
- 548-561 The strategically ignorant principal
by Bedard, Nicholas C.
- 562-567 Strategic manipulation in tournament games
by Vong, Allen I.K.
- 568-582 Information revelation through bunching
by Wang, Tao
- 583-623 Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
by Thompson, David R.M. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin
- 624-644 Equilibrium trust
by Anderlini, Luca & Terlizzese, Daniele
- 645-665 Interim third-party selection in bargaining
by Kim, Jin Yeub
- 666-686 Zero-sum games with charges
by Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries & Zseleva, Anna
- 687-699 Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence
by Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M.
2017, Volume 101, Issue C
- 6-19 A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
by Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark
- 20-33 Implementation under ambiguity
by de Castro, Luciano I. & Liu, Zhiwei & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 34-48 A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 49-62 Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
by Krajbich, Ian & Camerer, Colin & Rangel, Antonio
- 63-77 Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
by Echenique, Federico & Galichon, Alfred
- 78-97 Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
by Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke
- 98-120 Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
by Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie & Zhong, Xiaohan
- 121-131 Sincere voting in large elections
by Acharya, Avidit & Meirowitz, Adam
- 132-150 Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
by Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
- 151-171 One man, one bid
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Zhang, Jingjing
- 172-188 Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
by Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A.
- 189-203 Balancing the power to appoint officers
by Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo
- 204-217 Generalized Groves–Ledyard mechanisms
by Healy, Paul J. & Jain, Ritesh
- 218-233 Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
by Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas
- 234-259 How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
by Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan
- 260-272 Reciprocity networks and the participation problem
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish
- 273-290 Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability
by Kopányi-Peuker, Anita & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph
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