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The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences

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  • Hu, Gaoji
  • Li, Jiangtao
  • Tang, Rui

Abstract

We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins and meets of matchings.

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2020. "The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 305-318.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:305-318
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1704-1723, September.
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    5. Federico Echenique & Sangmok Lee & Matthew Shum & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 153-171, January.
    6. Federico Echenique, 2008. "What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 757-768, August.
    7. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 155-190, August.
    8. Chambers,Christopher P. & Echenique,Federico, 2016. "Revealed Preference Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107087804.
    9. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, 2016. "A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1235-1268.
    10. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Geoffroy Clippel & Kareen Rozen, 2023. "Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 813-825, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Revealed preference; Stable matchings; One-sided preferences; Lattice structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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