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Series handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe
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Content
2019, Volume 117, Issue C
- 276-288 Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
by Ichihashi, Shota
- 289-315 An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities
by Corazzini, Luca & Galavotti, Stefano & Valbonesi, Paola
- 316-321 An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept
by Voorneveld, Mark
- 322-341 Proper scoring rules with general preferences: A dual characterization of optimal reports
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Healy, Paul J. & Lambert, Nicolas S.
- 342-360 Understanding outcome bias
by Brownback, Andy & Kuhn, Michael A.
- 361-379 Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator
by Hanato, Shunsuke
- 380-387 Hedging, ambiguity, and the reversal of order axiom
by Oechssler, Jörg & Rau, Hannes & Roomets, Alex
- 388-401 Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes
- 402-419 The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games
by Klumpp, Tilman & Konrad, Kai A. & Solomon, Adam
- 420-432 Teams promise but do not deliver
by Nielsen, Kirby & Bhattacharya, Puja & Kagel, John H. & Sengupta, Arjun
- 433-450 Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis
by Maaser, Nicola & Paetzel, Fabian & Traub, Stefan
- 451-460 Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion
by Gravel, Nicolas & Poitevin, Michel
- 461-478 Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation
by Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei
- 479-498 The truth behind the myth of the Folk theorem
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael & Seeman, Lior
2019, Volume 116, Issue C
- 1-37 On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
by Trost, Michael
- 38-64 A strategic product for belief functions
by Stauber, Ronald
- 65-72 Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
by Peralta, Esteban
- 73-95 Decisions under uncertainty in social contexts
by Müller, Stephan & Rau, Holger A.
- 96-104 Exploration and correlation
by Piermont, Evan & Teper, Roee
- 105-115 Claim games for estate division problems
by Peters, Hans & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries
- 116-121 Scale effects in multi-unit auctions
by Elskamp, Rebecca & Kirkegaard, René
- 122-127 Strategic voting when participation is costly
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 128-151 Competition for talent when firms' mission matters
by Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia
- 152-157 An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
by Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Gottlieb, Daniel
- 158-178 Rhetoric matters: A social norms explanation for the anomaly of framing
by Chang, Daphne & Chen, Roy & Krupka, Erin
- 179-184 Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
by Nax, Heinrich H. & Newton, Jonathan
- 185-202 Comprehensive rationalizability
by Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 203-216 On the identification of changing tastes
by Mihm, Maximilian & Ozbek, Kemal
- 217-240 The development of consistent decision-making across economic domains
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Combs, T. Dalton & Kodaverdian, Niree
- 241-259 Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
by Mechtenberg, Lydia & Tyran, Jean-Robert
- 260-268 Liability games
by Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P.
- 269-288 Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
by Roy, Jaideep & Silvers, Randy & Sun, Ching-Jen
2019, Volume 115, Issue C
- 1-29 Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
by Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M.
- 30-47 Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
by Richter, Michael
- 48-59 Bayesian versus heuristic-based choice under sleep restriction and suboptimal times of day
by Dickinson, David L. & McElroy, Todd
- 60-82 Nonparametric utility theory in strategic settings: Revealing preferences and beliefs from proposal–response games
by Castillo, Marco E. & Cross, Philip J. & Freer, Mikhail
- 83-100 Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study
by Chen, Yan & Kesten, Onur
- 101-112 Bid caps in large contests
by Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron
- 113-130 In and out of equilibrium II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
by van Veelen, Matthijs & García, Julián
- 131-145 Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
by Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron
- 146-166 Vanguards in revolution
by Shadmehr, Mehdi & Bernhardt, Dan
- 167-187 Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules
by Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin & Romm, Assaf
- 188-208 Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: Money ain't no good
by Rosato, Antonio & Tymula, Agnieszka A.
- 209-224 Fair share and social efficiency: A mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division
by Dong, Lu & Falvey, Rod & Luckraz, Shravan
- 225-246 Dual sourcing with price discovery
by Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias
- 247-264 Price dispersion in stationary networked markets
by Talamàs, Eduard
- 265-288 On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete
by Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico
- 289-313 Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers
by Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp
- 314-335 A theory of esteem based peer pressure
by Adriani, Fabrizio & Sonderegger, Silvia
- 336-345 The duality gap for two-team zero-sum games
by Schulman, Leonard J. & Vazirani, Umesh V.
- 346-362 Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter? On the demotivational effect of losing in repeated competitions
by Haenni, Simon
- 363-380 Playing games with bounded entropy
by Valizadeh, Mehrdad & Gohari, Amin
- 381-395 Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
by Wang, Siyu & Houser, Daniel
- 396-409 Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies
by Metzger, Lars Peter & Rieger, Marc Oliver
- 410-435 A belief-based theory of homophily
by Kets, Willemien & Sandroni, Alvaro
- 436-458 On endogenous formation of price expectations
by Le Van, Cuong & Navrouzoglou, Paulina & Vailakis, Yiannis
- 459-469 Measuring time and risk preferences in an integrated framework
by Abdellaoui, Mohammed & Kemel, Emmanuel & Panin, Amma & Vieider, Ferdinand M.
- 470-490 On Hurwicz–Nash equilibria of non-Bayesian games under incomplete information
by Beißner, Patrick & Khan, M. Ali
2019, Volume 114, Issue C
- 1-27 The problem of multiple commons: A market design approach
by Tierney, Ryan
- 28-46 Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies
by Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T. & Tejada, Oriol
- 47-82 A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
by Parise, Francesca & Ozdaglar, Asuman
- 83-100 Bargaining with private information and the option of a compulsory license
by Bond, Eric W. & Samuelson, Larry
- 101-117 Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
by Catonini, Emiliano
- 118-127 The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types
by Rusch, Hannes
- 128-145 Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach
by Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam
- 146-168 Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium
by Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Heggedal, Tom-Reiel
- 169-176 Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth
by Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
- 177-192 Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
by Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda
- 193-214 Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining
by Isoni, Andrea & Poulsen, Anders & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei
- 232-252 Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
by Fragiadakis, Daniel E. & Troyan, Peter
- 253-267 An experiment on the efficiency of bilateral exchange under incomplete markets
by Rud, Olga A. & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Sharifova, Manizha
- 268-284 The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams
by Ramalingam, Abhijit & Stoddard, Brock V. & Walker, James M.
- 285-307 Recursive non-expected utility: Connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity
by Evren, Özgür
- 308-314 Welfare maximization entices participation
by Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Hofbauer, Johannes
- 318-323 A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]
by Günther, Michael & Kuzmics, Christoph & Salomon, Antoine
2019, Volume 113, Issue C
- 4-16 A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
by Vöcking, Berthold
- 17-37 Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
by Georgiou, Konstantinos & Swamy, Chaitanya
- 38-57 Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)
by Fiat, Amos & Koutsoupias, Elias & Ligett, Katrina & Mansour, Yishay & Olonetsky, Svetlana
- 58-79 Competitive contagion in networks
by Goyal, Sanjeev & Heidari, Hoda & Kearns, Michael
- 80-96 Optimal crowdsourcing contests
by Chawla, Shuchi & Hartline, Jason D. & Sivan, Balasubramanian
- 97-115 Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
by Kleinberg, Robert & Weinberg, S. Matthew
- 116-136 Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
by Dilmé, Francesc
- 137-146 Promises, expectations & causation
by Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Dufwenberg, Martin & Papa, Stefano & Passarelli, Francesco
- 147-163 Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment
by Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc
- 164-185 On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
by Lambert, Nicolas S. & Marple, Adrian & Shoham, Yoav
- 186-198 Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game
by Stern, Ari & Tettenhorst, Alexander
- 199-208 Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
by Turhan, Bertan
- 209-222 Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
by Chakraborty, Indranil
- 223-247 Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
by Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik
- 248-261 Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions
by Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier & Rafels, Carlos & Ybern, Neus
- 262-284 Regime change in large information networks
by de Martí, Joan & Milán, Pau
- 285-305 Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
by Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus
- 306-338 Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media
by Miura, Shintaro
- 339-355 Polyequilibrium
by Milchtaich, Igal
- 356-380 Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response
by Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung
- 381-395 Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: When are evolutionary models reliable?
by Stephenson, Daniel
- 396-415 The instability of matching with overconfident agents
by Pan, Siqi
- 416-422 Credit auctions and bid caps
by Lagziel, David
- 423-447 Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions
by Breitmoser, Yves
- 448-460 Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
by Fehr, Dietmar & Sutter, Matthias
- 461-481 The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
by Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert
- 482-496 How to choose your victim
by Abbink, Klaus & Doğan, Gönül
- 497-514 Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?
by Roberti, Paolo
- 515-532 Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: A strategic perspective
by Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien
- 533-548 Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks
by Fainmesser, Itay P.
- 549-565 Testing models of belief bias: An experiment
by Coutts, Alexander
- 566-586 Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking
by Polonio, Luca & Coricelli, Giorgio
- 587-610 The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games
by Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Koriyama, Yukio & Sutan, Angela & Willinger, Marc
- 611-632 Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
by Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng
- 633-650 Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
by Sawa, Ryoji
- 651-672 Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge
by Kurschilgen, Michael & Marcin, Isabel
- 673-693 Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
by Nath, Swaprava & Sandholm, Tuomas
- 694-719 Voting with public information
by Liu, Shuo
- 720-733 A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining
by Ortner, Juan
- 734-742 The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games
by Norde, Henk
- 743-755 The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel
- 756-769 Contests between groups of unknown size
by Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry
- 770-780 Belief-updating rule and sequential reciprocity
by Jiang, Lianjie & Wu, Jiabin
2018, Volume 112, Issue C
- 1-20 Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
by Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H.
- 21-48 Strategy-proof location of public facilities
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc
- 49-66 The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners
by Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo
- 67-77 Revealed time preference
by Dziewulski, Paweł
- 78-97 Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
by Cooper, David J. & Ioannou, Christos A. & Qi, Shi
- 98-124 Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
by Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin
- 125-138 King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Van Essen, Matt
- 139-165 Communication with evidence in the lab
by Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo
- 166-193 Bidding games and efficient allocations
by Meir, Reshef & Kalai, Gil & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 194-218 Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies
by Tóbiás, Áron
- 219-230 Financial complexity and trade
by Galanis, Spyros
- 231-241 Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis
by Bonanno, Giacomo & Tsakas, Elias
2018, Volume 111, Issue C
- 1-15 On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël
- 16-19 The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable
by Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad
- 20-40 A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
by Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per
- 41-63 A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data
by Aguiar, Victor H. & Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
- 64-74 No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
by Leucci, Stefano & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Penna, Paolo
- 75-84 Free intermediation in resource transmission
by Han, Lining & Juarez, Ruben
- 85-99 Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs
by Jang, Dooseok & Patel, Amrish & Dufwenberg, Martin
- 100-121 Goal bracketing and self-control
by Hsiaw, Alice
- 122-142 Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation
by Fischer, Mira & Sliwka, Dirk
- 143-158 A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games
by Chen, Chun-Ting & Huang, Chen-Ying & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
- 159-186 (Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem
by Diasakos, Theodoros M. & Koufopoulos, Kostas
- 187-202 Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
by Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma
- 203-216 Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
by Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N.
- 217-221 A simple characterization of responsive choice
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Yenmez, M. Bumin
- 222-240 Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution
by Tarbush, Bassel
- 241-249 On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
by Ellis, Andrew
- 250-273 Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games
by Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor
- 274-288 Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation
by Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian
- 289-304 On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information
by Khan, M. Ali & Zhang, Yongchao
- 305-322 How long is a minute?
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Tarrasó, Jorge
2018, Volume 110, Issue C
- 1-18 On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
by Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus
- 19-31 An axiomatization of plays in repeated games
by Mathevet, Laurent
- 32-49 Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
by Alcalde, José
- 50-57 Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
by Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo
- 58-70 Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies
by Iskakov, M. & Iskakov, A. & d'Aspremont, C.
- 71-89 The object allocation problem with random priorities
by Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz
- 90-119 Preemptive investment under uncertainty
by Steg, Jan-Henrik
- 120-138 Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem
by Perea, Andrés
- 139-164 The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
by Chen, Xi & Diakonikolas, Ilias & Paparas, Dimitris & Sun, Xiaorui & Yannakakis, Mihalis
- 165-173 Information acquisition and the value of bad news
by Ispano, Alessandro
- 174-193 Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
by Mu'alem, Ahuva & Schapira, Michael
- 194-215 Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
by Wenner, Lukas M.
- 216-225 Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
by Rehbeck, John
- 226-247 Price competition in product variety networks
by Ushchev, Philip & Zenou, Yves
- 248-257 Rationalizability and logical inference
by Balkenborg, Dieter
- 258-272 Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions
by Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore
- 273-294 Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip & Newton, Jonathan
- 295-317 Matching in the large: An experimental study
by Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min
- 318-329 To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions
by Augenblick, Ned & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron
- 330-339 Dynamic communication with biased senders
by Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex
2018, Volume 109, Issue C
- 1-20 Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
by Britz, Volker
- 21-39 Belief updating and the demand for information
by Ambuehl, Sandro & Li, Shengwu
- 40-64 An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner
by Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv
- 65-81 Volunteering under population uncertainty
by Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian
- 82-98 A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives
by Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien
- 99-103 A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly
by Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor V.
- 104-125 Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
by Lubensky, Dmitry & Schmidbauer, Eric
- 126-131 Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams
by de Oliveira, Henrique
- 132-155 Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
by Blume, Andreas
- 156-183 Cognitive ability and games of school choice
by Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco
- 184-200 Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders
by Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone
- 201-211 The lattice of envy-free matchings
by Wu, Qingyun & Roth, Alvin E.
- 212-239 The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment
by Kawagoe, Toshiji & Matsubae, Taisuke & Takizawa, Hirokazu
- 240-261 Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
by Mishra, Debasis & Nath, Swaprava & Roy, Souvik
- 262-270 Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic
by Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny
- 271-293 Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
by Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu
- 294-310 Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination
by Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi
- 311-326 Goal setting in the principal–agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance
by Corgnet, Brice & Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín & Hernán-González, Roberto
- 327-363 Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule
by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro
- 364-381 Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro
- 382-400 Bounded memory and incomplete information
by Sperisen, Benjamin
- 401-412 Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent
by Li, Zifan & Tewari, Ambuj
- 413-435 On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia
- 436-451 Perceived motives and reciprocity
by Orhun, A. Yeşim
- 452-464 Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted
by Smith, Vernon L. & Wilson, Bart J.
- 465-483 Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
by Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio
- 501-522 A theory of bargaining deadlock
by Hwang, Ilwoo
- 523-543 Indexing gamble desirability by extending proportional stochastic dominance
by Hellman, Ziv & Schreiber, Amnon
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