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The agency costs of on-the-job search

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  • Herbold, Daniel
  • Schumacher, Heiner

Abstract

This paper studies how workers' on-the-job search influences optimal incentives in organizations. We analyze a principal-agent model in which the agent multitasks between working for the principal and searching for other job opportunities. The agent partly uses on-the-job search to improve his bargaining position within the relationship. We show that the optimal contract may feature both excessive performance bonuses as well as efficiency wages. Both measures reduce the agent's search incentives, but do not completely eliminate rent-seeking under the optimal contract. On-the-job search therefore generates agency costs. The model suggests a new rational for excessive incentive pay and efficiency wages.

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  • Herbold, Daniel & Schumacher, Heiner, 2020. "The agency costs of on-the-job search," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 435-452.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:435-452
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games; Multitasking; Efficiency wages; On-the-job search;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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