IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v120y2020icp336-344.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information

Author

Listed:
  • Alston, Max

Abstract

This article extends the model of matching with incomplete information presented by Liu et al. (2014) by imposing exogenous restrictions on the beliefs of firms. The main result is that generically, there is always some game that contradicts the imposition of exogenous beliefs. This result complements Liu et al. (2014) by showing that their focus on stability for all reasonable beliefs is appropriate.

Suggested Citation

  • Alston, Max, 2020. "On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 336-344.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:336-344
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825620300099
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
    3. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
    4. Mohammed Abdellaoui, 2002. "A Genuine Rank-Dependent Generalization of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 717-736, March.
    5. Chakraborty, Archishman & Citanna, Alessandro & Ostrovsky, Michael, 2010. "Two-sided matching with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 85-105, January.
    6. Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2014. "Stable Matching With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 541-587, March.
    7. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    8. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
    9. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
    10. Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2013. "Pricing and investments in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    11. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-141, November.
    12. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
    13. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2017. "Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 29-49, March.
    14. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
    2. Agranov Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers 273, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. Chen, Yi-Chun & Hu, Gaoji, 2024. "Bayesian stable states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 102-116.
    4. Shi, Fanqi, 2021. "Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 492-502.
    5. Peralta, Esteban, 2024. "Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 51-58.
    6. Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," Working Papers 2021-74, Princeton University. Economics Department..

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2016. "On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 106-123.
    2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Hu, Gaoji, 2024. "Bayesian stable states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 102-116.
    3. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Peralta, Esteban, 2024. "Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 51-58.
    5. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    6. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.
    7. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Westkamp, Alexander, 2014. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 232-251.
    8. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    9. Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020. "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    10. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    11. Han, Seungjin & Sam, Alex & Shin, Youngki, 2024. "Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    12. Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa, 2012. "Group robust stability in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 394-398.
    13. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo & Kojima, Fuhito, 2015. "Efficient assignment with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 54-86.
    14. Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi, 2015. "Matching markets under (in)complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 295-314.
    15. Yun Liu, 2017. "On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 121-151, June.
    16. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
    17. Dasgupta, Sulagna, 2024. "Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 5-16.
    18. Kawaguchi, Riho & Yanagisawa, Daichi & Nishinari, Katsuhiro, 2019. "Decision-making with reference information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 519(C), pages 109-118.
    19. Benoit Decerf & Guillaume Haeringer & Martin Van der Linden, 2024. "Incontestable Assignments," Papers 2401.03598, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    20. Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:336-344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.