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On self-serving strategic beliefs

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  • Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.
  • Schneider, Florian H.
  • Weber, Roberto A.

Abstract

We experimentally study whether individuals adopt negative beliefs about others' intentions to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study compares the beliefs held by players with such an incentive to the beliefs of neutral observers and finds no evidence that individuals engage in “strategic cynicism.” This contrasts with other recent evidence demonstrating that people hold less positive beliefs about others when doing so allows them to act more self-interestedly. We reconcile the discrepancy, using a simple model of belief manipulation and a novel experiment that replicates and extends the earlier findings. Across three datasets, we find no evidence of negatively biased beliefs in absolute terms. However, those with a greater incentive to view others' intentions cynically exhibit relatively less positive beliefs. Our contribution expands our understanding of the psychological forces underlying self-serving belief manipulation, by noting that strategic cynicism may compete with a tendency towards positivity in determining individuals' beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Ging-Jehli, Nadja R. & Schneider, Florian H. & Weber, Roberto A., 2020. "On self-serving strategic beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 341-353.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:122:y:2020:i:c:p:341-353
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016
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    3. Paul Bengart & Theo Gruendler & Bodo Vogt, 2021. "Acute tryptophan depletion in healthy subjects increases preferences for negative reciprocity," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(3), pages 1-16, March.
    4. Hajdu, Gergely, 2024. "Excusing Beliefs about Third-party Success," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 362, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    5. Sund, Oda Kristine Storstad, 2023. "Unleveling the Playing Field? Experimental Evidence on Parents’ Willingness to Give Their Child an Advantage," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 21/2023, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    6. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant, 2018. "It's Not A Lie If You Believe It. Lying and Belief Distortion Under Norm-Uncertainty," PPE Working Papers 0012, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Lata Gangadharan & Philip J. Grossman & Nina Xue, 2022. "Stepping Stone: Identifying self-image concerns from motivated beliefs: Does it matter how and whom you ask?," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-05, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. Lata Gangadharan & Philip J. Grossman & Nina Xue, 2021. "Identifying self-image concerns from motivated beliefs: Does it matter how and whom you ask?," Monash Economics Working Papers 2021-17, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    9. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:4:p:932-949 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant & Silvia Sonderegger, 2020. "It's Not a Lie If You Believe the Norm Does Not Apply: Conditional Norm-Following with Strategic Beliefs," CESifo Working Paper Series 8059, CESifo.
    11. Friedrichsen, Jana & Momsen, Katharina & Piasenti, Stefano, 2022. "Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 100, pages 1-1.
    12. Grunewald, Andreas & Klockmann, Victor & von Schenk, Alicia & von Siemens, Ferdinand, 2024. "Are biases contagious? The influence of communication on motivated beliefs," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 109, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    13. Dorin, Camille & Hainguerlot, Marine & Huber-Yahi, Hélène & Vergnaud, Jean-Christophe & de Gardelle, Vincent, 2021. "How economic success shapes redistribution: The role of self-serving beliefs, in-group bias and justice principles," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 932-949, July.
    14. Bicchieri, Cristina & Dimant, Eugen & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2023. "It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: Conditional norm-following and belief distortion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 321-354.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Motivated beliefs; Strategic cynicism; Bias; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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