When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.008
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- ,, 2009.
"Strategy-proofness and single-crossing,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP48, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
- Sato, Shin, 2013. "A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 259-278.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2012.
"Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 335-352, July.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Single-dipped preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 801.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences," Working Papers 418, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Puppe, Clemens, 2018.
"The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 55-80.
- Puppe, Clemens, 2016. "The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization," Working Paper Series in Economics 97, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Puppe, Clemens, 2017. "The Single-Peaked Domain Revisited: A Simple Global Characterization," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168068, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
- Zhang, Jun, 2019. "Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 167-177.
- Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
- Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 327-363.
- Bade, Sophie, 2019. "Matching with single-peaked preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 81-99.
- Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 168-177.
- Nesterov, Alexander S., 2017. "Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 145-168.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
- Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
- Zhou, Lin, 1990. "On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 123-135, October.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Ito, Tamon & Osawa, Yu-ichi, 2006. "Duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 142-170, January.
- Westhoff, Frank, 1977. "Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 84-112, February.
- Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
- Martini, Giorgio, 2016. "Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 172-179.
- Bade, Sophie, 2016. "Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 257-262.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ramezanian, Rasoul & Feizi, Mehdi, 2022. "Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 356-367.
- Morimoto, Shuhei, 2022. "Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Liu, Peng & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 176-194.
- Zhang, Jun, 2019. "Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 167-177.
- Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Ramezanian, Rasoul & Feizi, Mehdi, 2022. "Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 356-367.
- Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021.
"A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2017. "A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategy-proof Rules," MPRA Paper 79363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 153-185, July.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2001. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence," Game Theory and Information 0112002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2004.
- Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2018. "On random social choice functions with the tops-only property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 413-435.
- Pycia, Marek & Ünver, M. Utku, 2015.
"Decomposing random mechanisms,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 21-33.
- Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2014. "Decomposing Random Mechanisms," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 870, Boston College Department of Economics.
- YIlmaz, Özgür, 2010. "The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 475-491, July.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November.
- Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2022.
"Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Shurojit Chatterji & Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Arunava Sen & Huaxia Zeng, 2021. "Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains," Papers 2105.10677, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
- Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 156-181.
- Puppe, Clemens & Slinko, Arkadii, 2024. "Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 426-450.
- Puppe, Clemens & Slinko, Arkadii, 2022. "Maximal Condorcet domains: A further progress report," Working Paper Series in Economics 159, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
- Gopakumar Achuthankutty & Souvik Roy, 2018.
"On single-peaked domains and min–max rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(4), pages 753-772, December.
- Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017. "On Single-peaked Domains and Min-max Rules," MPRA Paper 81375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Puppe, Clemens, 2018.
"The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 55-80.
- Puppe, Clemens, 2016. "The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization," Working Paper Series in Economics 97, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Puppe, Clemens, 2017. "The Single-Peaked Domain Revisited: A Simple Global Characterization," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168068, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
- Demeulemeester, Tom & Goossens, Dries & Hermans, Ben & Leus, Roel, 2023. "A pessimist’s approach to one-sided matching," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1087-1099.
- Basteck, Christian, 2018. "Fair solutions to the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-172.
More about this item
Keywords
Object allocation; Efficiency; Fairness; Group strategy-proofness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:119:y:2020:i:c:p:251-266. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.