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A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation

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  • Mackenzie, Andrew

Abstract

We consider probabilistic versions of obviously strategy-proof implementation (Li, 2017) for stochastic rules, and provide an algorithm involving several ideas from the literature (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018; Pycia and Troyan, 2016; Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017) that converts any such implementation into a randomized round table implementation, where the administrator randomly selects a game form in which agents take turns making public announcements about their private information (Theorem 1). We provide an analogous algorithm for sure implementation of deterministic rules (Theorem 2); this builds on related results from the literature by (i) relaxing all recall requirements, (ii) allowing randomization by the agents, and (iii) allowing all game trees for which choices determine plays (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016). We discuss a variety of implications and related topics.

Suggested Citation

  • Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:512-533
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    3. Siyang Xiong, 2024. "Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle," Papers 2402.13580, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    4. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    5. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    6. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    7. Pablo R. Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2023. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Working Papers 293, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    8. Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    9. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Mass'o & Alejandro Neme, 2024. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Papers 2409.05315, arXiv.org.
    10. Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    11. Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 181-196.
    12. Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    13. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    14. Soo Hong Chew & Wenqian Wang, 2022. "Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms," Papers 2205.10844, arXiv.org.
    15. Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

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