A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.010
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Cited by:
- Pablo R. Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2023. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Working Papers 293, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org.
- Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 181-196.
- Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022.
"Menu mechanisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2020. "Menu Mechanisms," Discussion papers e-19-012, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2022. "On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
- Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
- Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
- Siyang Xiong, 2024. "Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle," Papers 2402.13580, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
- Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023.
"All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof," Working Papers 1108, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2021. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Working Papers 49, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 966.19, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021.
"A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design,"
ECON - Working Papers
393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Pycia, Marek & Troyan, Peter, 2022. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 14043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Soo Hong Chew & Wenqian Wang, 2022. "Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms," Papers 2205.10844, arXiv.org.
- Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Clayton Thomas, 2020. "Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof," Papers 2011.12367, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
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Keywords
Obvious strategy-proofness; Revelation principle; Randomized round table mechanism;All these keywords.
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