The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00123888
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Cited by:
- John M. Barron & Kathy Paulson Gjerde, 1996. "Who Adopts Total Quality Management (TQM): Theory and An Empirical Test," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 69-106, March.
- Bos, Dieter & Peters, Wolfgang, 1995. "Double inefficiency in optimally organized firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 355-375, March.
- Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-254, April.
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